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"I am of opinion that the law forbidding the creating of new tenants
by means of subinfeudation was always the law of the Colony, and
that it was the law of this State, as well before as after the passage of
our act concerning tenures, in 1787."
Van Rensselaer v. Hays
Court of Appeals of New York (1859)1
"[T]he existence of a town or city where the streets, alleys, school
houses, business houses, sewerage system, hotels, churches, thea-
ters, waterworks, market places, dwellings, and tenements are the
exclusive property of a corporation is opposed to good public pol-
icy, and incompatible with the theory and spirit of our institutions."
People ex rel. Moloney v. Pullman's Palace-Car Co.
Supreme Court of Illinois (1898)2
"In our judgment, 'no trespass' signs represent the last dying rem-
nants of paternalistic behavior."
State v. Shack
Supreme Court of NewJersey (1971) 3
I.
PROPERTY AND THE AMERICAN DREAM
Property is a social and political institution and not merely an
individual entitlement. For this reason, the legal structure of property
reflects norms and values that are not fully expressed by reference to
the market value of property rights. Consider the current subprime
mortgage crisis in the United States: The family home is the core of
the American Dream, and that means that property is central to the
way we Americans define ourselves as a people. Does the prospect of
several million foreclosures jeopardize property rights or vindicate
them? Families need a place to live, and we therefore expect afforda-
ble housing to be available; at the same time, no one has a right to a
home he cannot afford, and we cannot expect to stay in a home when
we are not paying the mortgage. Are the massive foreclosures we are
experiencing a problem or a solution to a problem? We cannot an-
swer this question merely by reference to current law or to economic
considerations; rather, we must attend to the full range of our values.
This requires us to attend to the ways that property law shapes social
life and either supports or undermines democratic values.
1 19 N.Y. 68, 74 (N.Y. 1859).
2 51 N.E. 664, 674 (I11. 1898).
3 277 A.2d 369, 373 (N.J. 1971) (quoting N.J. GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON MIGRANr
FARM LABOR, THE REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR's TASK FORCE ON MiGRANT FARM LABOR 63
(1968)).
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The foreclosure crisis was a prime issue in the 2008 presidential
election. 4 This occurred not only because of the effects of the foreclo-
sure crisis on the overall economy, but because the families who face
foreclosure have a claim that they are suffering unjust treatment.
What makes the problem a political one is not only the assertion of
economic interest by those vulnerable to foreclosure, but also their
sense that they should be entitled to remain in their homes if they can
restructure their loans to make them affordable. The question of
whether families should be entitled to remain in their homes in such
circumstances requires consideration of our deepest values. It impli-
cates choices about the kind of society we want to live in and the na-
ture of the obligations we owe to each other.
Many families bought homes with little or no down payment and
initially low interest rates that are now blooming into unaffordable,
high rates.5 Those mortgages were then securitized and sold in trans-
actions that hid their shaky economic foundations. 6 This made it dif-
ficult for home owners to figure out whom to call to attempt
negotiations when they fell behind in their mortgage payments. Fore-
closures have ensued at a time when real estate values have collapsed. 7
This foreclosure explosion has now triggered a grave financial crisis
for those mortgage lenders who face homes valued less than the out-
standing debts, with repercussions for the entire U.S. economy.8 Con-
centrations of foreclosed properties in particular neighborhoods are
leading to downward spirals that threaten the economic underpin-
nings of many localities.9 Figuring out how to think about this crisis
not only involves economic policy and political calculation; it chal-
lenges our conceptions of both property and property law. How
should property law respond to this crisis in property ownership?
Republicans and Democrats tend to disagree about how to an-
swer this question. While Republicans generally take a more liberta-
rian, free-market approach,10 Democrats favor a more regulatory,
4 SeeJohn McCain Outlines New Initiatives to Provide Immediate Help for American
Families (Apr. 10, 2008), http://www.ohiogop.org/news/articles/2008/04/john-mccain-
outlines-new-initiatives-provide-immediate-help-american-families (on file with author)
[hereinafter McCain Outlines New Initiatives]; Sen. Barack Obama, Plan to Strengthen the
Economy, http://ww.barackobama.com/issues/econoniy/#home-onership (last visited
Feb. 1, 2009).
5 See President George W. Bush, President's Address to the Nation on the Economic
Crisis (Sept. 24, 2008), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/24/business/econ-
omy/24text-bush.html?_r=1&oref=slogin.
6 See id.
7 See id.
8 See id.
9 Richard E. Gottlieb & AndrewJ. McGuinness, When Bad Things Happen to Good Cit-
ies: Are Lenders to Blame?, 17 Bus. L. TODAY, July-Aug. 2007, at 13.
10 See Nick Timiraos, Homeownership Push Is Rethought: Both Candidates Weigh the Best
Path to American Dream, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2008, at A4 (explaining that Senator McCain
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protective, and progressive one." Republicans are champions of "lib-
erty" and believe that government interference in the economy kills
the goose that laid the golden egg. They also generally adopt the lib-
ertarian view that regulations constitute an assault on individual au-
tonomy because they interfere with freedom of contract. Worse still,
government intervention constitutes illegitimate paternalism: it treats
individuals like children who cannot make their own decisions, and it
saps their independence by rejecting the notion of personal responsi-
bility and self-reliance. People who act foolishly should suffer the con-
sequences of their own mistakes rather than expect the government to
bail them out. Whether they reason from efficiency or liberty con-
cerns, Republicans are likely to argue that it is best just to let this
drama play itself out.
Democrats, on the other hand, adopt the progressive view that
the market is an arena of social life, structured and regulated by law,
and are thus far more comfortable with conscious government efforts
to shape economic relationships to promote fair arrangements. They
view government regulation of market relationships as desirable, for
example, when it protects consumers from misleading and unfair con-
tract terms. Fraudulent and abusive practices constitute both market
failures and assaults on individual dignity and thereby justify govern-
ment intervention. More fundamentally, markets are not states of na-
ture; rather, they are structured by law. Far from impeding the
market, regulations set the ground rules for economic interaction by
defining and allocating property rights and appropriately enforcing
contracts. Regulation is simply another word for the rule of law, with-
out which the free market would be replaced by the war of all against
all. Hobbes and Locke taught us that law enables the creation of
wealth, 12 and Rawls reminds us that it establishes the basic structures
that determine whether property is fairly distributed. 13 Unlike Repub-
licans, Democrats also assume that individuals can face hard times
through no fault of their own: self-reliance is not a sufficient answer to
the vicissitudes of economic life. Democrats therefore favor govern-
ment action to provide a safety net when things get rough. 14 If
"has warned against lending to homeowners who don't have enough of their own capital in
the investment" and discussing McCain's support of a bill making "it harder for lower- and
middle-class consumers to file for bankruptcy").
I See, e.g., id. (explaining Senator Obama's support of greater regulation and discuss-
ing Obama's advisors' aversion to "privatization" as the only plan to solve the housing
crisis).
12 See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (G.A.J. Rogers & Karl Schuhmann eds.,
Oxford World Classics 1998) (1651);JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter
Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
13 See generally JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OFJUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999) (1971).
14 See Sen. Barack Obama, Remarks of Senator Barack Obama: Our Common Stake in
America's Prosperity (Sept. 17, 2007) [hereinafter Our Common Stake], http://wvw.ba-
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Republicans favor such a safety net at all, they tend to do so only
grudgingly: it would be political suicide to attempt to abolish Social
Security and Medicare entirely, even if the Republicans' underlying
philosophy would counsel in favor of doing so.
President Bush generally followed the libertarian line-for in-
stance, he threatened to veto legislation (sponsored by Representative
Barney Frank) that would make federally insured mortgages available
to help distressed home owners refinance their loans on more afforda-
ble terms.15 Surprisingly however, President Bush changed his mind
and signed the legislation eventually passed by Congress. 16 In a simi-
lar surprise, the major candidates for President in 2008, Barack
Obama and John McCain, agreed on how to respond to the housing
crisis. For one thing, they both professed to favor a pragmatic ap-
proach, seeking to solve the problem and not to do anything that
would backfire and make things worse. They both rejected approach-
ing the problem from a dogmatic, ideological point of view. "I will
not allow dogma to override common sense," said John McCain. 1 7 Ba-
rack Obama similarly commented that "we cannot simply look back-
wards for solutions.., to hope that the New Deal programs born of a
different era are, by themselves, somehow adequate to meet the chal-
lenges of the future. No, we are going to have to adapt our institu-
tions to a new world as we always have."18 But more surprisingly,
McCain and Obama both favored government assistance to home
owners to help them keep their homes.' 9
At the same time, at least initially, McCain and Obama had rather
different ways of evaluating what the problem is and what kinds of
solutions should be considered to fix it. Their approaches reflected
differences of principle. John McCain initially asserted, for example,
"I will not play election year politics with the housing crisis .... I will
consider any and all proposals based on their cost and benefits."20
This framing of pragmatism suggests that a rational approach to the
rackobama.com/2007/09/17/remarks of senatorbarackobam_24.php ("[P]art of my
agenda will be to modernize and strengthen America's safety net for working
Americans.").
15 David M. Herszenhorn, Bush Advisers Oppose Housing Measure, and Vow a Veto, N.Y.
TIMES, May 7, 2008, at C2; see Press Release, Rep. Barney Frank, Frank Announces New
Economic, Mortgage and Housing Rescue Proposal (Mar. 13, 2008), available at http://
www.house.gov/frank/fha0308.html.
16 Jennifer Loven, Bush Signs Housing Bill to Provide Mortgage Relief ASSOCIATED PRESS,
July 30. 2001, LexisNexis Academic.
17 Press Release, Sen. John McCain,John McCain Addresses the Housing Crisis (Mar.
25, 2008), available at http://www.procon.org/sourcefiles/McCain20080325.pdf.
18 Our Common Stake, supra note 14.
19 See sources cited supra note 4.
20 Liz Sidoti, McCain Leaves Housing Crisis Options on Table: GOP Presidential Nominee
Places Limits on Government Assistance, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 26, 2008, LexisNexis
Academic.
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problem requires objectively and realistically assessing the conse-
quences of alternative courses of action. The rhetoric of "costs and
benefits" suggests that those consequences should be measured by
market values rather than by idealistic assumptions about the world or
controversial value judgments. In contrast, Obama invoked Franklin
D. Roosevelt in calling for a "re-appraisal of our values as a nation,"21
arguing that "in this country, our right to live must also include the
right to live comfortably" and that we need "a renewed trust in the
market and a renewed spirit of obligation and cooperation between
business and workers; between a people and their government."22
Obama thus framed the question differently than McCain. He agreed
with McCain that a pragmatic approach requires attention to the
likely consequences of alternative courses of action, but he suggested
that we should assess those consequences through the lens of value
judgments rather than reliance solely on market prices.
Like most Republicans, McCain professes a libertarian approach
to economics and law. He is far more skeptical than Obama about
government regulation and financial support to help individuals and
institutions faced with economic crises. Initially, for example, McCain
opposed assistance to the families who bought homes with loans they
could not afford to pay back. Rather, he obliquely suggested that
those families are to blame for their own troubles: they face foreclo-
sure because they made poor decisions. "I have always been commit-
ted to the principle that it is not the duty of government to bail out
and reward those who act irresponsibly, whether they are big banks or
small borrowers," McCain said. 23 On the other hand, McCain did
favor help to the banking industry if the systemic effects of noninter-
vention were substantial. "Government assistance to the banking sys-
tem should be based solely on preventing systemic risk that would
endanger the entire financial system and the economy."24 Based on
this approach, he grudgingly seemed to favor the Federal Reserve
Bank's bailout of Bear Stearns.25 When asked if "the Fed went too far
in helping Bear Stearns," McCain said, "It's a close call, but I don't
think so."26
The libertarian view that those who enter a bad deal have only
themselves to blame is the basis for the idea that individuals should
face the consequences of their own mistakes. The moral principle of
21 Our Common Stake, supra note 14.
22 Id.
23 Sidoti, supra note 20.
24 Id.
25 Casting McCain as Opponent of Fed Intervention in Mortgage Crisis, Blitzer Ignored His
Approval of Bear Stearns Aid, MEDIA MA-rERS, Mar. 26, 2008, http://mediamatters.org/
items/200803280005.
26 Id.
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self-reliance means that if individuals cannot comply with the contract
terms to which they committed themselves, they should lose their
homes through foreclosure. Painful though this may be, there is
nothing government should do about it; after all, this is the remedy
they agreed to in the event they did not make their payments. Such
interventions only mess up the free market, encourage dependence,
and foster an ethic of paternalism that denies dignity to those suppos-
edly being helped. Intervention to help big financial institutions is
another matter: the whole economy depends on their continuing to
function, and failing to help them would affect the rest of us.
This view suggests that there are no externalities that we suffer
when millions of families lose their homes; unlike the financial effects
of the failure of large financial institutions that would harm our pock-
etbooks, these individual foreclosure stories are tragedies that do not
affect the rest of us, at least not in ways that justify government inter-
vention. The effect is thought to be merely emotional rather than
financial; it is, in some sense, not "real," or at least it is not the kind of
harm that government action should remedy. If we feel affected by
these individual tragedies, we can always indulge in charity to our
neighbors. Charity is something McCain believes that mortgage lend-
ers may engage in as well. Those lenders have "been asking the gov-
ernment to help them out," McCain said. "I'm now calling upon
them to help their customers, and their nation, out."27 It is not clear,
however, that such lenders are entitled to do so under current law,
unless they can show that such help improves the bottom line. If not,
current law appears to prohibit or discourage corporate charity to cus-
tomers; after all, corporations owe their prime duties to their share-
holders, not their customers or the public at large. 28
Democrats, in contrast, are more inclined to help the little guy:
they hope to help prevent families from losing their homes. For ex-
ample, Barack Obama supports "cracking down on mortgage fraud"
and "protect[ing] consumers against abusive lending practices." 29 If
home buyers were misled into purchasing homes through mortgages
they could not afford, their inability to comply with contractual mort-
27 Domenico Montanaro, McCain: "We're Succeeding", MSNBC, Mar. 25, 2008, http://
firstread.msnbc.msn.com/archive/2008/03/25/803794.aspx.
28 For a contrary view, see KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAw: FUNDA-
MENTAL FLAws AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES (2006); Joseph William Singer, Corporate Re-
sponsibility in a Free and Democratic Society, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REv. (forthcoming 2009) (both
arguing that corporations have responsibilities to the public and to stakeholders other
than shareholders).
29 Sen. Barack Obama, Barack Obama's Policy on the Foreclosure Crisis [hereinafter
Policy on the Foreclosure Crisis], http://www.barackobama.com/issues/economy/#home-
ownership (last visited Feb. 1, 2009); see also Sen. Barack Obama, Protecting Homeowner-
ship and Cracking Down on Mortgage Fraud, http://www.barackobama.com/issues/econ-
omy/ (last visited Feb 1. 2009); Our Common Stake, supra note 14.
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gage terms is arguably not their fault, but the fault of those who got
them in over their heads. These individual home buyers are victims of
fraud, a wrong we can conceptualize as a wrongful taking of property
under false pretenses. The fact that millions of families are facing
foreclosure now suggests that this was not merely a matter of a few
irresponsible miscreants. Rather, an entire market was created in sell-
ing and financing homes to those who could not qualify for more
traditional mortgages. The widespread nature of this market suggests
that reasonable people could have been taken-in by clever (and per-
haps misleading) marketing, as well as the widespread desire to par-
ticipate in the American Dream of owning a home.
Government regulates business to ensure the safety of consumer
products. Perhaps, as Elizabeth Warren has argued, we need govern-
ment protection from defective financial products as well. 30 Although
we value self-reliance in the United States, we also expect businesses to
comply with minimum standards; they are obligated to treat their cus-
tomers with common decency.
Democrats are also far less averse than Republicans to govern-
ment intervention to help people out in hard times, regardless of who
is at fault for their predicament. When natural disasters like Hurri-
cane Katrina strike, Americans clamor for federal intervention and
aid. Why should economic disasters be any different? Of course, we
do not want to adopt policies that promote irresponsibility, but most
economic misfortune befalls individuals because of events beyond
their control. Thus, Obama supported the Barney Frank bill that
would "create a fund to help [people] refinance their mortgages and
provide comprehensive supports to innocent homeowners." 31 Obama
also supported regulations to alter the terms of existing mortgages.
While Hillary Clinton proposed achieving this end through imposing
a mortgage-foreclosure moratorium, Obama proposed accomplishing
this end by amending bankruptcy laws to allow bankruptcy courts to
modify mortgages to lower payments owed to lenders.32 The eventual
law moves in the direction of rewriting the terms of mortgages but
does so in an oblique fashion. If lenders of subprime mortgages agree
to reduce the principal owed on the loan (to 90 percent of the home's
30 Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer: The Case for Regulation, HARvARD MAG.,
May-June 2008, at 34 [hereinafter Warren, Making Credit Safer]; Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe
at Any Rate: If It's Good Enough for Microwaves, It's Good Enough for Mortgages. Why We Need a
Financial Product Safety Commission, DEMOCRACYJ., Summer 2007, available at http://democ-
racyjournal.org/article.php?ID=6528.
31 Sen. Barack Obama, Protecting Homeownership and Cracking Down on Mortgage
Fraud in Iowa, http://obama.3cdn.net/54d4a826cbee880b5e_4gulmvl9d.pdf (last visited
Feb. 1, 2009).
32 Compare Sen. Hillary Clinton, Remarks on Wall Street on Housing Crisis (Dec. 5,
2007), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=77081, with Policy
on the Foreclosure Crisis, supra note 29.
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current fair market value) and if they replace those mortgages with
more conventional, affordable, fixed-rate mortgages, the federal gov-
ernment will subsidize the arrangement by insuring payment of the
new loans.33
The Democratic approach assumes that we are all affected when
there are millions of foreclosures. Some of this effect is economic:
neighborhoods with numerous empty homes lower property values
for everyone and depress economic activity. But some of the external-
ities are moral rather than financial: contrary to the ideology of self-
reliance, the progressive mantra is that we are in this together and we
owe obligations to our fellows who face hard times. Obama
explained,
We have not come this far because we practice survival of the fittest.
America is America because we believe in creating a framework in
which all can succeed. Our free market was never meant to be a
free license to take whatever you can get, however you can get it.
And so from time to time, we have put in place certain rules of the
road to make competition fair, and open, and honest. We have
done this not to stifle prosperity or liberty, but to foster those things
and ensure that they are shared and spread as widely as possible. 34
Interestingly, whether out of a change of heart or political conve-
nience, John McCain came to repudiate substantially his earlier em-
brace of the philosophy of small government and self-reliance (at least
in the context of the foreclosure crisis), as well as his use of cost-bene-
fit analysis as the appropriate framework for judging how to respond
to it. Instead of preaching self-reliance and the virtues of economic
efficiency, McCain stated that he sought to "help[] Americans with
the housing crisis" and that he "believes there is nothing more impor-
tant than keeping alive the American Dream of owning a home."35
His website repeated McCain's view that, as a matter of principle, the
government should only assist the banking system to prevent "systemic
risk" and that no assistance should be forthcoming to "real estate spec-
ulators or financial market participants who failed to perform due dili-
gence in assessing credit risks."'3 6 At the same time, McCain's website
also reported that he now favored federal government funding to
help "those hurt by the housing crisis," including "every deserving
American family or homeowner."3 7 McCain defined "deserving Amer-
ican families" as those who took out subprime mortgages after 2005
that "can prove creditworthiness at the time of the original loan;
33 Loven, supra note 16; Provisions of Housing-Mortgage Relief Bill, ASSOCtATED PRESS,
July 30, 2008, LexisNexis Academic.
34 Our Common Stake, supra note 14.
35 McCain Outlines New Initiatives, supra note 4.
36 Id.
37 Id.
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are . . . unable to continue to meet their mortgage obligations; and
can meet the terms of a new 30 year fixed-rate mortgage on the ex-
isting home," and he wanted to help by replacing their unaffordable
mortgage with a new conventional mortgage through a loan from the
Federal Housing Administration. 38 This suggests support for the core
elements of the legislation that Congress and the President eventually
enacted into law. McCain also supported a Justice Department task
force that would "aggressively investigate potential criminal wrongdo-
ing in the mortgage industry and bring to justice any who violated the
law."'39 While this proposal does not recommend legislative or regula-
tory reforms like those proposed by the Democrats, it does suggest
support for regulations designed to avoid false or misleading sales
tactics.
The change in position by both McCain and Bush is instructive.
Americans reflexively oppose "big government" but support the myr-
iad regulations and social programs that government enacts. They do
not want regulations, but they do want laws that protect them from
defective products and unsafe workplaces; laws that protect them
from polluted air and water; and laws that regulate land use to prevent
factories from being located in the middle of residential subdivi-
sions.40 They do not want government to interfere with the free mar-
ket but they do want government to protect "hard-working
Americans" from losing their homes. They are skeptical of big gov-
ernment but just as skeptical of big business. They like the idea of
small government but not the practice: when hard times strike, they
demand government action. This suggests that the American people
embrace both sides of the libertarian/progressive split. It turns out
that we are deeply ambivalent about the relationship between law and
economics. It also means that we have a similar ambivalence about
property rights.
Libertarian and progressive approaches to the subprime mort-
gage crisis reflect competing views of the appropriate role of govern-
ment in the economy, but they also reflect very different conceptions
of property and property law. The libertarian story McCain initially
told suggests that it is better to have owned and lost than never to
have owned at all. Work hard and you can buy a home, but you have
no right to a home you cannot afford. If you cannot afford a house,
that must be your own fault; America provides opportunity if you will
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Joseph William Singer, Things That We Would Like to Take for Granted: Minimum Stan-
dards for the Legal Framework of a Free and Democratic Society, 2 HARv. L. & PoL'Y REv. 139, 140
(2008) ("This means that liberty is not possible without regulation; paradoxically, the lib-
erty we experience in the private sphere is only possible because of the regulation we im-
pose in the public sphere.").
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only take it. Those who have property deserve to keep it, and those
who want property must work for it. If you bought a house you cannot
afford, and it is now being taken away because you failed to make your
payments, what have you to complain about? You have no right to a
home you have not paid for.
The progressive story suggests, in contrast, that the foreclosure
crisis is (for the most part) not the result of irresponsible conduct on
the part of home buyers, but the result of irresponsible conduct on
the part of mortgage lenders. Those lenders should not have been
pitching loans to families that could not afford them. Contrary to the
libertarian story, it is not better to have owned and lost than never to
have owned at all. Rather, it would be better not to buy a home one
cannot afford; financially, a family is likely to be better off by renting
than by paying a higher monthly mortgage fee and then losing all the
equity in the home when home prices fall.41 The disruption of evic-
tion from a foreclosed home and of having one's credit rating de-
stroyed is best avoided. No family wants to face this and, if these
families had better information, they would not have entered these
deals. In contrast to the libertarian argument that contracts are fair if
the parties agree to them, the progressive response is that fairness re-
quires contract terms that one could accept if one did not know on
which side of the bargaining table one would be sitting.42 Contracts
should not be enforceable if they do not have reasonable terms, and if
a family is able to make payments that reflect reasonable rates of re-
turn, then home financing contracts should be rewritten to change
the terms of the deal to reflect more reasonable arrangements. In this
way, both banks and home owners may avoid the costs of foreclosure.
The banks earn less than they otherwise would have, but they are
partly or mainly at fault for marketing financial products to customers
who could not afford them; on the other side, home owners have a
legitimate interest in keeping their homes that justifies market regula-
tion to prevent displacement and homelessness. The legislation
passed by Congress in response to the foreclosure crisis broadly re-
flects this set of progressive understandings.
41 Of course, the tax deduction given for interest payments on mortgages may change
the economic calculation dramatically; at the same time, foreclosure may ruin the bor-
rower's credit rating in a manner that makes her worse off in the long run.
42 Singer, supra note 40, at 159 (noting that such egalitarian-minded questions high-
light how regulations not only set rules but also set standards of conduct requiring each
person to be treated with concern and respect).
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II.
PROPERTY LAW AS A PROBLEM
What do these competing stories tell us about the place of prop-
erty and property law in American life? Property is central to the
American story. In their first history lessons, children are taught
about brave western settlers staking claims in the wilderness, building
the family home, planting the crops, and reaping the rewards of hard
labor. John Locke is the ultimate Founding Father. In our national
myth, we conveniently set aside, for the moment, the little problems
of conquest of Indian nations, the enslavement of Africans, and the
unequal status of women. We imagine instead an abundant land
open to all who are willing to work hard. Property is there for the
taking and, once acquired, legitimately kept until transferred volunta-
rily by the owner. Family homes and businesses are established, and
trades occur with the resulting security and wealth for all. To top it all
off, our property rights are constitutionally protected against state in-
terference or seizure, at least without compensation; 43 they are a core
bulwark protecting us from big government, thereby securing our
liberties.
Although property is at the core of the American Dream, the
place of property law is far less certain, despite its almost ubiquitous
presence in the first year curriculum of law schools. For one thing,
property law has always been depressingly technical and complicated.
Though relished by those who enjoy puzzles, geometry, and para-
doxes, the estates system has long had an old-fashioned, encrusted,
anomalous feel about it. Its very vocabulary boggles the mind: who
but a lawyer has ever heard of "privity of estate" or the "fee simple
subject to executory limitation"? But more worrisome than its com-
plexity and technicality is property law's tendency to impose limita-
tions on the freedom of owners to control their own land. These
worries afflict both grantors and grantees. On the grantor side, if I
want to create a future interest, why will the law not let me do so? On
the grantee side, if one's home is one's castle, why are owners limited
by things like easements, covenants, rights of entry, and liens? Who is
the lord of this castle anyway?
Because property law is both technical and intrusive, there are
perennial attempts to figure out what, if anything, is good about it.
Suppose we reformed property law to excise all those technicalities
and intrusive limitations on liberties of owners. What would be left?
The answer: not much. Most of the property law course could fold
into the other basic courses. Conflicts among neighbors about land
use (the realm of nuisance doctrine) is arguably the province of tort
43 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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law. Regulations of land use through zoning and environmental law
can be relegated to municipal and environmental law courses. Limita-
tions on takings of property should really be part of the constitutional
law course. And why are contracts concerning the use and transfer of
land not simply part of the contracts course? There are special rules
about such transactions, but then there are special rules about insur-
ance contracts, employment contracts, partnerships, marriages, and
corporations too. If we parcel out property law to other courses in
this manner, is anything left? And if there is, is it important?
The answers are: yes, something is left, and it is important. How-
ever, explaining what is unique about property turns out to be a sur-
prisingly complicated task. When you ask law professors why property
law is a crucial building block for legal education, they are likely to
give three answers: The first thing they will say is that no other course
considers the origins of the rights we bring to the bargaining table
when we begin to contract with each other. This is why almost every
casebook has a chapter on the original acquisition of property rights.
The second unique thing about property law is the fact that it
protects rights against the world rather than rights against particular
individuals, as is the case with contract law. Just as criminal and tort
law protect our bodies from harm by limiting the freedom of everyone
in the world, our property rights are protected against invasion by eve-
ryone. We say property rights are held in rem rather than in per-
sonam. 44 And in order for this protection to be meaningful, property
law identifies a bundle of rights that owners have against the world.
These rights are not things you have to bargain for; they are rights
that go along with ownership.
The in rem nature of property rights leads to the third unique
thing about property law. Although property law allows owners to
transfer particular sticks in the bundle of rights to others, it also limits
our ability to disaggregate that bundle by transferring some sticks
while keeping others. On the contrary, property law requires that cer-
44 Professors Henry Smith and Thomas Merrill have usefully explored the implica-
tions of this fact about property rights. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith,
Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1,
54-55 (2000) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization] (noting that it is im-
practical to bundle in personam rights to create an in rem right and that therefore transac-
tion costs will prevent assignable contracts from replacing property rights); Thomas W.
Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 773 passim
(2001) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Property/Contract Interface] (considering why the legal
system maintains the distinction between in rem and in personam rights through an analy-
sis of four legal institutions: bailments, landlord/tenant law, security interests, and trusts);
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, VWat Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111
YALE L.J. 357, 385-98 (2001) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, What Happened?] (discussing
the costs of adopting an economic analysis of property that ignores the in rem nature of
property rights).
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tain sets of rights in the bundle stick together (so to speak); when you
transfer certain property rights, others have to go along for the ride.
Unlike the law of contracts, which revolves around the central norma-
tive premise of freedom of contract, property law partially limits the
bundles of rights we can create by identifying a predefined set of
prepackaged estates defined by law. Antitrust law would call these "ty-
ing arrangements"; contract law would call them "mandatory terms";
property law calls them "estates." The law limits the estates one can
create to ensure that, at any moment, we can identify an owner for the
property in question, and we have some notion of the bundle of pow-
ers that the owner has over the resources.
These answers of course only raise more questions. For one
thing, the origins story told in property law courses is remarkably mis-
leading. If you believe the casebooks, we acquire original title to
property by conquering other nations, hunting animals, encroaching
on our neighbors' lands, and finding lostjewels. 45 These methods of
acquisition are historically inaccurate: they do not describe the actual
ways in which property titles were originally created in the United
States.46 Moreover, none of them describes a major method by which
property is created or acquired today. To the contrary, most property
is acquired today from family sources through inheritance and mar-
riage or from market relationships centered on work and investment.
Why then do we focus on conquest and possession as the origins
of rights in land? I believe we do so in order to frame property issues
in an ideological manner to suggest that existing property rights legiti-
mately originate in actions that reflect individual desert.47 The idea of
first possession embodies a Lockean image of a vast unimproved land,
open for the taking by hardy settlers who establish property rights
through hard labor.48 While this story may serve the ideological pur-
pose of pretending that property has just origins in American history,
it tells us almost nothing about the source of property rights that we
bring to the bargaining table today. Moreover, if we were to take seri-
45 See, e.g.,Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai.
175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805); Hannah v. Peel, (1945) 1 KB. 509.
46 1 have criticized this litany elsewhere. SeeJoseph William Singer, Starting Property,
46 ST. Louis U. LJ. 565, 571-72 (2002) [hereinafter Singer, Starting Property]; see also Jo-
seph William Singer, Original Acquisition of Property: From Conquest and Possession to
Equal Opportunity (2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
47 Even the conquest story reflects the norm of first possession. It does so either by
emphasizing that the land in the United States was obtained from the Indian nations
through treaties or peace agreements following wars, or by acknowledging the injustice of
forced seizure of Indian lands but relegating such questions to the distant past and thus
allaying these concerns. See Singer, Starting Property, supra note 46, at 568-69.
48 Even adverse possession trades on the image of first possession since it invariably
describes a case in which the true (or record) owner acquiesces in the encroachment by
effectively abandoning exclusionary claims. See id. at 568.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1009
2009]
ously the idea that property rights are legitimate only if they have le-
gitimate origins, then we would have to reorient our thinking to focus
on the concept of equal opportunity and the extent to which it is pre-
sent or lacking in contemporary American society. Property origins
are only legitimate if we have equal chances to become owners, not
just in the distant past, but today. Philosopher Brian Barry has ar-
gued, for example, that if we took the principle of equal opportunity
seriously, we would have to make major changes in government policy
and law.49 We would also have to change, in fundamental ways, the
law of property.
A more fruitful reason to treat property law as a basic subject in
law school is the estates concept. Traditionally, the estates system was
justified by the idea of promoting alienability and the policy of limit-
ing the power of the "dead hand" of prior owners to curtail the free-
dom of current owners. Yet, it is not clear that the technical estates
system we have inherited serves these purposes well at all. That lack of
fit has generated a great deal of skepticism about the estates system,
especially surrounding its technicalities. Indeed, one of the major
reasons for publication of the Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes)
was to get rid of technicalities like privity of estate and the "touch and
concern" requirement for covenants. 50
In response to this skepticism about the estates system, some
property scholars have begun rethinking the justifications for it. In
recent articles, Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith have usefully ex-
plained the core importance of property law (and especially the es-
tates concept) for the legal system.51 They have argued that what is
unique about property is its in rem nature and that because property
rights are held against the whole world, they need to be clear and
understandable. The estates system limits the bundles of rights we
can create in land (what they call the "numerus clausus principle"), and
this allows potential buyers to know what rights go along with owner-
ship of particular resources. The informational advantage of bundled
rights not only has efficiency effects by lowering the costs of transac-
tions through clarifying who owns what and defining what rights the
owners have, but also has a moral foundation in cohering with ordi-
49 See BRIAN BARRY, WHY SOCIAL JUSTICE MATTERS 44 (2005) (noting that a just system
would have to provide people more than one chance, such that losing out at the beginning
does not permanently close doors).
50 See Susan F. French, Highlights of the New Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, 35
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.J. 225, 228, 229 (2000) (arguing that the major goals of the Third
Restatement were to avoid "confusion and unnecessary complexity in the law" as well as to
get rid of "obsolete doctrines" like privity of estate and the touch and concern test).
51 See generally sources cited supra note 44.
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nary expectations about the powers of owners.52 Their argument is a
welcome corrective to the prevailing skepticism about the very idea of
the estates system.
Let us recall why the estates system is so disturbing to modern
sensibilities. A libertarian of Lockean or Nozickian bent would find
the estates concept baffling. We start with a full owner of land who
(we assume) acquired her property rights legitimately. That owner
has no lord and owes no allegiance to any superior. She has full rights
over her own property. She is, so to speak, lord of her own castle. She
is free to use her property as she likes as long as she does not harm
others or invade their space. She is also free to transfer her property
to anyone she wishes, and no one can take her land from her without
her consent. If she does transfer it, a libertarian might well believe
that the idea of freedom of contract suggests that she should be free
to transfer one of the sticks in the bundle-or two or three-while
keeping the others. She should also be free to place conditions on
the transfer of rights. Why should government stop her from disag-
gregating her property rights in this way or conditioning their trans-
fer? If both parties are better off from a contract to create an
easement or a covenant or a future interest, then respecting these
newly created packages of rights not only furthers autonomy but is
wealth maximizing and efficient. From this libertarian, free-contract
perspective, the estates system is anathema. It prevents the creation of
certain packages of rights that the owner wishes to create and that the
buyer wishes to buy and does so for no good reason. Although gifts
do not involve mutual agreements about terms, donees are free to
reject gifts with conditions they do not like, and if they accept the gift
terms, we arguably have evidence that they believe they are better off
with a conditional gift than no gift at all; regulating the terms of the
gift decreases the freedom and welfare of both parties.
From both the libertarian and efficiency point of view, there
seems to be nothing to gain (and a lot to lose) by limiting freedom of
contract or freedom of disposition. Restrictions on disaggregation of
property rights can only decrease freedom and well-being by prevent-
ing individuals from entering mutually beneficial arrangements. And
anyone who wants to reassemble a fee simple (full ownership rights)
can simply bargain with the owners of each of the sticks, just as one
could try to buy four contiguous parcels of land to develop a large
project.
Professors Merrill and Smith respond to these libertarian and ef-
ficiency critiques of estates by explaining why there are both efficiency
and moral advantages to limiting our ability to disaggregate property
52 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 1849, 1857 (2007).
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rights as we wish. Freedom of contract and freedom of disposition are
important values, but they have their limits. 53 Merrill and Smith ar-
gue that a system that imposes no limits on our ability to create estates
would allow highly complicated packages of rights to exist.54 This
would increase transaction costs; after all, one may have to read a
complicated document before one can find out what rights one will
acquire if one buys a house.55 Moreover, if one fails to investigate
fully-a fact of life that property lawyers know is commonplace in a
country where lawyers are often not involved in routine property
transactions-a buyer will be unfairly surprised by odd encumbrances
on her title, thereby decreasing her welfare and defying her justified
expectations. And the transaction costs of getting out of the deal then
are very high. Simplification and standardization of the bundles of
rights associated with forms of ownership thus arguably lower infor-
mation costs, promote property use and transfer, and confer moral
legitimacy on property arrangements. 56
While this argument is a highly welcome corrective to the tradi-
tional suspicion of the estates system, it does not tell the whole story.
First, Merrill and Smith recognize that while the estates system limits
the bundles of rights one may create, it does so in a manner that actu-
ally allows an enormous amount of freedom and complexity.57 There
are particular property arrangements that are outlawed (more on this
later), but it is not really true that the estates system currently func-
tions to simplify things. After all, even though the law limits us to the
fee simple, the defeasible fee, the life estate, the lease, and mortgage-
financing arrangements of various kinds, property law places few lim-
its on the kinds of conditions and covenants that can be imposed on
land ownership. There is no rule against transferring property to an-
other person "until Barack Obama wins the presidency," for example.
The conditions and restrictions one can create can be quite weird,
defying ordinary expectations. Nor does the current system result in
anything close to simplification. Indeed, the widespread use of home-
owners associations means that buyers of land must search the volumi-
nous covenants, conditions, and restrictions contained in the
recorded declaration, as well as the governing rules of the association,
to find out what their fights will be if they buy the property. Worse
53 Freedom of disposition refers to grants through gifts or wills that do not involve a
contract between individuals but rather are voluntary transfers from one to another. Gifts
can be rejected, of course, and thus have a flavor of mutuality, but they are not the subject
of a prior mutual agreement.
54 See Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 44, at 3-10.
55 See id.
56 Id. at 8.
57 See Glen 0. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 1449, 1483-84
(2004) (making this argument).
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still, doing so will give them no security; after all, covenants and con-
dominium rules can change over time as the homeowners association
chooses. Owners of such homes are subject to the whim of their
neighbors, just as feudal tenants were subject to the whim of their
lords.
Merrill and Smith are correct that our system lowers information
costs by identifying presumptive owners of physical plots of land and
that standardization of packages of property rights can lower informa-
tion costs. 58 However, it is not at all clear that our current system of
property law results in any type of simplification or standardization of
the package of rights that goes along with ownership. And if that is
true, then it is not clear how our estates system actually lowers infor-
mation costs at all. Nor is it clear that the estates system, as currently
structured, coheres with ordinary morality and thus protects justified
expectations. After all, perhaps the most surprising thing about the
property law course is the estates system. Few people but lawyers have
heard about the life estate or the "fee simple" or future interests such
as "rights of entry" and "possibilities of reverter." Students have heard
of leases and mortgages and, depending on the kind of housing they
have, they may be (perhaps acutely) aware of easements and cove-
nants. Merrill and Smith are correct that property law helps preserve
the perceived legitimacy of property by identifying owners, but it may
well overstate the case to identify simplification with common moral-
ity.5 9 Indeed, in many cases, the exact opposite is true.
Common morality often sides with complexity rather than sim-
plicity. For example, the implied warranty of habitability was invented
because tenants expected landlords to provide services like heat and
hot water when they rented apartments even though neither their
leases nor the common law required landlords to provide these
things. 60 Similarly, owners tend to rely on long-fixed borders rather
than the "metes and bounds" measurements contained in documents
filed in the registry of deeds: hence the doctrine of adverse posses-
sion.61 When an owner builds a new house in her backyard, the buyer
of that house expects to be able to get to it by going over the common
driveway, regardless of what the deed says. 62 When a developer
promises to restrict lots to residential uses, buyers expect the devel-
oper to abide by that promise, even if the formal covenants give the
developer the power to control the architectural commission, and the
developer uses that power to renege on that promise for the last lots
58 See Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 44, at 24-42.
59 See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 52, at 1850.
60 See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
61 See, e.g., Brown v. Gobble, 474 S.E.2d 489, 496 (W. Va. 1996).
62 See, e.g., Finn v. Williams, 33 N.E.2d 226, 228 (Ill. 1941).
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sold. 63 A ranch owner who gives dozens of friends and employees the
right to erect homes around a lake on his ranch should not be sur-
prised that they expect to be able to continue to use those homes,
even if he did not give them formal leases, easements, or deeds.64
I do not mean to argue that all these cases are easy; indeed, we
see substantial disagreement among the states on how to handle these
cases and the many variations of them that can arise in practice. I do
want to claim that our estates system creates a combination of simplic-
ity and complexity and that it is a mistake to focus on one without the
other. Laura Underkuffler teaches us to look at property and prop-
erty law through two different lenses: our reigning idea of property
revolves around the absolute rights of owners, but the institution of
property embodied in our law is complicated with property rights lim-
ited to protecting the rights of other owners and non-owners, as well
as the public at large. 65 We have, she argues, both a "common" con-
ception of property as absolute rights and an "operative" conception
that involves substantial complexity. 66
Professor Underkuffler argues that that the common conception
of property revolves around the idea of ownership as absolute rights
and that this idea not only exerts a powerful cultural force but has
great utility.6 7 The ownership idea does serve the purpose of identify-
ing a person or institution that has the presumptive power to control
land. It is absolutely correct to say, with Merrill and Smith, that the
estates system is associated with limitations on the sets of rights that
can be created in land, but I think Underkuffler's description gives us
the key to understanding the significance of those limitations. With
the exceptions of leases, mortgages, and options to purchase land, fu-
ture interests are not commonly used in land transfers today in the
United States, although they are still common in trusts of personal
property. The key to the estates system is the idea of ownership it-
self-an idea that reflects an image of property as a castle. 68 There
are efficiency gains in presumptively identifying owners of parcels of
land, and there are strong moral and political reasons to promote in-
dividual autonomy by conferring broad powers on owners to live their
lives as they please in their own homes. There are similar reasons
63 See, e.g., Appel v. Presley Cos., 806 P.2d 1054, 1056 (N.M. 1991).
64 See, e.g., Rase v. Castle Mountain Ranch, Inc., 631 P.2d 680, 685-86 (Mont. 1981).
65 See LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 51
(2003).
66 See id.
67 See generally id.
68 Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings of Property: Castles, Invest-
ments, and Just Obligations, 30 HARV. EN-VrL. L. REv. 309, 314-16 (2006) (discussing the
castle model of property and arguing that the citizenship model provides a better frame-
work from which to analyze the Takings Clause).
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(within limits) for giving individuals the power to control small busi-
nesses. (Big business raises different questions entirely.)
But let's not overstate the case. When we move from identifying
owners to defining the rights that go along with ownership, we move
from simplicity to complexity. After all, we give home owners more
power over what happens inside their homes than we give to those
who run businesses. You are allowed to choose your friends based on
race if you like, but restaurants cannot choose customers on this ba-
sis.69 When you open your property to others, the law intervenes to
protect the legitimate rights of employees and customers. And when
you get married, the law steps in to regulate marital property rights.
The law protects the rights of neighbors on the ground that land use
often imposes externalities on those neighbors: hence the law of nui-
sance (not to mention zoning, land use, and environmental law).
And when owners condition or restrict land transfers, we find conflict-
ing interests among owners mediated by the law of servitudes and the
law of leaseholds and mortgages. Some of these rules of law regulate
how property is used, but others insert complexity into the task of
determining who the owner is.
Underkuffler argues that there are good reasons why the institu-
tion of property is complex. She does not deny that, from an effi-
ciency standpoint, Merrill and Smith are correct in voicing the oft-
stated claim that markets can only work if we have fairly clear rules to
divide up assets and identify who owns them. 70 Before people can buy
and sell resources, we have to know who owns them, and we have to
know what rights go along with ownership. The efficiency gains of
consolidating rights (by limiting the ability of owners to disaggregate
rights into complex packages) are enormous. Consolidation pro-
motes alienability, protects legitimate expectations, and enables indi-
viduals to experience and exercise autonomy. But it is also obviously
true that there are efficiency gains from complexity. After all, one of
the most powerful traditional justifications for freedom of contract is
that we should give people the freedom to make arrangements that
suit their individual interests; social welfare improves when we enforce
mutually advantageous agreements, and it suffers if we prevent people
from tailoring property rights in ways that serve their mutual interests.
Merrill and Smith are right that strong protection for the "rights
of owners" does accord with some core aspects of common morality.
But the reason property law is so complicated is precisely because ab-
solute property rights are so contrary to common morality and hence
justified expectations. Time and again, when the owner argues for
absolute freedom in ways that harm what are perceived to be the legit-
69 See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 51-51.3 (West 2007).
70 See generally UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 65, at 37-51.
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imate interests of others, the courts or legislatures intervene to limit
owners' prerogatives; the law steps in to protect the interests of own-
ers' family members, their guests, their tenants, their employees, their
customers, their neighbors, and their communities. If property law
were simple, the property law books would be short, but the opposite
is the case. Indeed, we property professors generally have more rules
of law to teach than do contracts and torts professors. To be sure,
some of this complexity comes from old-fashioned technical rules that
we would best reform, as the Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes)
seeks to accomplish. But I want to argue that much of this complexity
is here to stay; this is because the exercise of property rights often
imposes externalities on others. Those externalities are not limited to
physical harms or discomfort but include effects that alter the charac-
ter of the environment and the neighborhood in which the property
is situated.71 When this happens, the law consistently limits the rights
of owners to protect the legitimate interests of both other owners and
non-owners who interact with owners. Underkuffler is right to em-
phasize the complexity of the institution of property.
III.
SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT ABOUT PROPERTY LAW
So how should we view the estates system? Let us consider six
approaches: (i) the traditional alienability approach; (ii) the legal realist
(or "bundle of rights") approach; (iii) the efficiency approach; (iv) the
libertarian approach; (v) the liberal egalitarian approach; and (vi) the
personality, human flourishing, capabilities, and virtue ethics approaches. I
will briefly explain how each approach views the estates system and
suggest what is good and bad about each way of thinking about the
issue. I will then propose a new paradigm, which I will call the demo-
cratic approach (with a small "d").
A. The Traditional Alienability Approach
The oldest view justified property law's technicalities by reference
to custom and the "nature of things." Many cases, for example, talk
about restraints on alienation as being "repugnant to the fee." 72 By
this, they mean that the very nature of a fee simple interest in land is
that it be alienable. This view could be a conceptualist one that fo-
cuses on the nature of the concept of full ownership embodied in the
71 See Joseph William Singer, How Property Norms Construct the Externalities of Ownership
4-5 (Harvard Law Sch., Harvard Pub. Law Working Paper No. 08-06, 2008), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1093341 (discussing a methodology for identifying exter-
nalities and the forms that externalities may Lake).
72 See, e.g., Nw. Real Estate Co. v. Serio, 144 A. 245, 246 (Md. 1929) (describing a
restraint on alienation as "clearly repugnant to the fee-simple title").
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fee simple, or it could be a customary one based on long held under-
standings about the nature of ownership. Alternatively, it could be
related to a conception of natural rights that was reflected in property
law through a long-term shift from feudal to allodial property.
Duncan Kennedy notes that in the first half of the nineteenth century,
courts in the United States sought to excise technical aspects of law in
order to shape law in a manner that promoted policy concerns and
that protected natural rights. 73 The shift away from old estates, such
as the fee tail, was associated with the movement from a feudal and
hierarchical social structure to a natural-rights conception of free and
equal individuals with rights to full ownership over land.74 This shift
was partial, however; the estates system, with its limitations on owner-
ship and its inherent complexity and technicality, have persisted to
this day. Property law could have been simplified by abolishing future
interests entirely. But alas, to the chagrin of law students everywhere,
this did not happen. Why not?
Over time, the traditional estates were justified by two general
policies: the promotion of alienability and freedom from the dead-
hand control of past owners. When particular packages of rights in
land were outlawed, the usual justification was the promotion of alien-
ability. Giving current owners the power to use property as they see fit
and to transfer it without needing to obtain the consent of future in-
terest or servitude owners made land more marketable. This allowed
land to operate as a commodity, changing hands from one owner to
another, while simultaneously giving owners the freedom to move to
another place rather than get stuck on the family estate. It also al-
lowed owners to change land use without getting the consent of a lord
or a future interest holder or other family members. Alienability thus
was thought to promote autonomy, equality, and social welfare. Simi-
larly, rules limiting the creation of certain future interests freed cur-
rent generations from undue control by prior generations, again
promoting autonomy, equal rights, and welfare.
The problem is that, as the efficiency theorists remind us, the
estates system both promoted and discouraged alienability. While ag-
gregating rights in current owners may free those owners to use the
land as they wish and transfer it without the consent of others
(thereby lowering transaction costs), the estates system limits the
73 DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 115-45 (pa-
perback ed. 2006).
74 See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY. COMPETING VISIONS OF PROP-
ERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776-1970, at 21 (1997) (noting the early American
efforts at "dismantling of 'aristocracy' and getting rid of all vestiges of feudalism"); LAw-
RENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF A.MERICAN LAW 230-55, 232, 239 (2d ed. 1985) (explain-
ing the new "ideal of a country of free citizens, small-holders living on their own bits of
land" and the rejection of the "tyrannical" and "feudal" past).
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power of owners to place conditions on the land when it is sold. If
one is nervous about the uses to which the land will be put once one
sells it (for example, if one continues to own neighboring land or
wishes to control the behavior of one's children), one will be reluctant
to part with the property unless one can condition its future use or
ownership. The traditional justification of the estates system as pro-
moting alienability focuses on the interests of grantees. But if we fo-
cus on the interests of grantors, it is obvious that the ability to
condition future use and ownership may actually increase alienability
by protecting the expectations and interests of sellers and donors of
land. And while children always want to be free of restrictions placed
on them by their parents, the children inevitably grow up and seek to
impose similar controls on their children.
Justification of the estates system by reference to the alienability
policy always sat in exquisite tension with the Lochner era's freedom-of-
contract policy. After all, the free-contract idea suggested that one
should be able to make any agreements one liked; that would mean
having the power to disaggregate property rights as one wishes by ei-
ther contract or gift or will. The alienability policy stood in tension
with the free-contract idea because the estates system prohibited cer-
tain contracts by requiring particular property rights to be bundled
together; in effect, the estates system imposes mandatory terms on
real estate transfers. There is a deep tension between the idea of own-
ership (with the current possessor having full rights over the land)
and freedom of contract (which would allow owners to condition the
sale of land on covenants, easements, future interests, leases, and
liens, thereby substantially limiting the powers of future owners).
Adopting a policy of "promoting alienability" thus creates a paradox:
the estates system both promotes and discourages alienability.
What norms do the alienability and dead-hand policies promote?
Both policies promote autonomy by giving owners greater freedom to
control their own lives; at the same time, by limiting the estates that
can be created, these policies also arguably limit autonomy. Similarly,
both policies promote marketability of land-and potentially effi-
ciency-by freeing landowners from undue control by third parties.
At the same time, limits on the estates that we can create may inhibit
efficiency by preventing the creation of mutually beneficial arrange-
ments. If that is so, where do we go from here?
B. The Legal Realist (or "Bundle of Rights") Approach
The legal realists helped us see the internal contradictions in the
policies underlying the estates system by unpacking the rights that go
along with ownership. Rather than assuming that we could use logic
or custom or reason to deduce what packages of property rights are
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"natural" or which ones promote alienability, they suggested that we
analyze the various rights that go along with ownership separately and
begin to think through the justifications for aggregation and disaggre-
gation of property rights. John Chipman Gray is a transitional figure
who tried to straddle both sides of the alienability and dead-hand
paradoxes. Gregory Alexander explains that Gray's scholarship both
espoused the traditional justifications of the estates system and dis-
played the legal realist inclination to use policy concerns to shape
rules of law. 75 Professor Gray pointed the way to a full-scale critique of
the traditional view that eventually bloomed into Wesley Hohfeld's le-
gal realist conception of property as a "bundle of rights" whose con-
tent should be determined by reference to policy considerations.
Rather than arguing that policy considerations require aggregating
property rights in an "owner," as Gray suggested, Professor Hohfeld
argued that one could not logically link ownership of any particular
right of ownership with any other particular right.76 If property is just
a bundle of rights, then it is a policy question which rights (if any)
must be bundled together and which can be usefully disaggregated.
The legal realist critique of the alienability approach was a useful
corrective to the traditional justification of the estates system for three
reasons. First, it pointed out the tension (or contradiction) between
the free-contract/free-disposition policies and the alienability policy.
Second, it clarified the analytical components of ownership and de-
manded careful justifications for allocating particular sticks in the
bundle of property rights to one person or another. Third, Hohfeld's
analytical terms were premised on the core idea that law involves rela-
tions among people and not relations between people and objects.
The legal realists argued that we should not think of ownership as
power over things; rather, we should conceptualize property rights as
relations among people with respect to things. This idea was a major
advance because it focused attention on the externalities of owner-
ship-for example, the ways the exercise of property rights affects
other owners, non-owners, and society as a whole.
At the same time, the legal realist approach had its own
problems. Taken to its extreme, the bundle-of-rights idea could sug-
gest that property has no meaning whatsoever as a legal category and
75 See ALEXANDER, supra note 74, at 285-89 (discussing Gray, his scholarship on re-
straints on alienation, and his belief that most property law was based on a few core princi-
ples and policies).
76 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Rea-
soning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 718-24 (1917); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE LJ. 16, 30-36 (1913) [hereinafter
Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions]; see also Joseph William Singer, The Legal
Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. Rv. 975,
986-89 (1983).
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that it only obscured the real issues underlying rule choices. What
matters are the particular rights in the bundle. We can allocate those
rights in any way we like based on the policy considerations we find
relevant. Thomas Grey's article, The Disintegration of Property, is usually
cited for this proposition.7 7 Professor Grey usefully questioned the
meaning of the general concept of property. Yet, just as there has
been somewhat of a backlash against Grant Gilmore's book, The Death
of Contract,78 there has been a scholarly backlash against Grey's
thesis.79
On the efficiency side, the legal realist idea that property is just a
bunch of entitlements that are not logically bound together has been
met with arguments that there are reasons of efficiency for particular
sets of bundled rights. As we have seen, Professors Merrill and Smith
have championed the informational advantages of bundled rights,
thereby giving a powerful efficiency justification for certain aspects of
the traditional approach.80 Similarly, Henry Hansmann and Reinier
Kraakman have revived the idea that property is as important a con-
cept as contract in understanding the corporate structure.8
On the justice and fairness side, the legal realist approach has
been criticized by libertarians and natural law theorists who seek to
revive the notion that property rights have a rationally discernible
content and that bundled rights are essential to protect individual lib-
erties.8 2 Liberal egalitarians have also criticized the realist approach,
explaining the continuing power of the conception of absolute owner-
ship. As noted earlier, Professor Underkuffler has powerfully argued
77 Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII, at 69,
69-85 (J. Roland Pennock &John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
78 GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACr (1995).
79 As an example of the backlash, see Alan Schwartz, Justice and the Law of Contracts: A
Case for the Traditional Approach, 9 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'v 107 (1986).
80 See Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 44, passim.
81 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The
Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S373, S405-07
(2002).
82 See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88
CORNELL L. REV. 1549, 1669-71 (2003) [hereinafter Claeys, Takings, Regulations]; Eric R.
Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase: Land-Use Torts, Law and Economics, and Natural Property Rights
20-25 (George Mason Univ. School of Law, George Mason Law & Econ. Research Paper
No. 08-20, 2008) [hereinafter Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase], available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract id=1117999. Neither Professor Epstein nor Professor Claeys identifies himself as a
libertarian; each has complicated and sophisticated theories of the boundaries of property
rights, and each combines a number of norms in defining those rights. Epstein combines
deontological arguments with consequentialist ones, and Claeys develops a modern form
of natural law analysis. Nevertheless, both Epstein and Claeys privilege the value of free
use and disposition of land and narrowly constrain the legitimate sphere of regulations
designed to promote other goals, such as redistribution of wealth to avoid undue inequal-
ity or zoning laws designed to promote particular neighborhood character.
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that the idea of property as full ownership not only is certain to persist
but that it serves useful functions in our understanding of the norma-
tive order of which property is a part.83 Similarly, I have argued that
the castle conception of ownership does important work in shaping
property norms that affect our understanding of the presumptive re-
sults in particular types of property disputes.8 4 And Professor Alexan-
der has similarly argued that internal contradictions in the commodity
conception of property require supplementation by reference to
norms concerning the role of property in the social order. 85 These
critiques of the legal realist idea of property as a bundle of rights sug-
gests that we need to rethink the benefits of the estates system.
C. The Efficiency Approach
As I noted earlier, contemporary legal theorists generally view the
estates system with a jaundiced eye. This is especially so for efficiency
theorists who worry a great deal about limitations on freedom of con-
tract. By limiting the packages of rights one can create, the estates
system embodies mandatory rules that limit the substantive terms of
agreements respecting land. Efficiency theorists tend to view such
mandatory terms extremely skeptically. Merrill and Smith bring
much-needed correction to that view by reminding us of the numer-
ous efficiency advantages of packaged rights and the inefficiencies of
having property rights that are too fragmented. 86 Michael Heller also
makes this point in his notion of the anticommons problem that can
arise from excessive multiplication of property rights. 8 7 Frank
Michelman has made a similar point.88
But something very important is missing from the approach to
the estates system from the efficiency standpoint. In his monumental
work, Commodity & Propriety: Competing Visions of Property in American
Legal Thought, Professor Alexander explains that property institutions
and property law serve multiple social functions.8 9 Specifically, prop-
erty serves a commodity function, allowing valued resources to be
83 UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 65, at 64-74.
84 Singer, supra note 68, at 316-22.
85 ALEXANDER, supra note 74, at I (arguing that property as commodity is only "one-
half of a dialect" and that "property is the material foundation for creating and maintain-
ing the proper social order, the private basis for public good").
86 See Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 44, at 3-10.
87 Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx
to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REv. 621, 624 (1998) ("When there are too many owners holding
rights of exclusion, the resource is prone to underuse.").
88 See Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property, 39 TULSA L. Rv.
663, 668 (2004) ("[Wie can safely conclude that the [private property] form must require
some restriction on decomposition of full ownership into privileges held without their con-
gruent rights, or rights without their congruent privileges." (emphasis in original)).
89 See ALEXANDER, supra note 74, at 1-15.
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used and exchanged in market transactions."° The law treating prop-
erty as commodity is generally concerned with increasing, if not maxi-
mizing, its market value, or alternatively with ensuring the utility and
transferability of property rights so that they can satisfy human wants
and needs. At the same time, Alexander argues that both property
and property law serve a different, more fundamental function: they
help to shape and establish the proper social order.9 1 The law treat-
ing property as a form of "propriety" is concerned not with fair market
value and market exchange, but with establishing property rights and
institutions that are consistent with and help establish the desired set
of social and political relationships.
Efficiency is too narrow a lens through which to view property
and property law. In his article, The Social-Obligation Norm in American
Property Law, Professor Alexander argues that property law promotes
human flourishing and human dignity and that it does so through
shaping desirable human relationships of reciprocity and commu-
nity.9 2 While efficiency analysis focuses on satisfying individual inter-
ests, Alexander's more communitarian and dignity-based approach
assumes that we have obligations to others in our community and to
those with whom we form relationships. He therefore analyzes the
social-obligation norm that shapes the legal definition of property and
argues that it better accounts for property law than explanations nar-
rowly based on efficiency concerns. 93 Alexander further argues that
this communitarian analysis is more normatively attractive than effi-
ciency analysis because it focuses our attention not only on market
values but also on appropriate social relations.9 4 In so doing, he ar-
gues that we must critically analyze preferences to determine whether
satisfying them is legitimate in particular contexts; rather than assume
that we have a moral right to demand anything we want, Alexander
argues that we have obligations to treat others with equal concern and
respect. This may mean that we have a duty to moderate our de-
mands that affect them.9 5 This in turn means that we need to shape
property rights with broader goals in mind.
Similarly, in his article, Land Virtues, Eduardo Pefialver, in think-
ing about the rights that go along with ownership of land, details a
number of limitations of efficiency analysis.9 6 Professor Pefialver ar-
gues that efficiency theorists tend to focus on maximizing the market
90 See id.
91 See id.
92 Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 COR-
NELL L. REv. 745, 760-73 (2009).
93 See id.
94 See id.
95 See id.
96 See Eduardo M. Pefialver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. Rev. 821, 832-60 (2009).
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value of land, and that even welfare theorists have a tendency to use
market values as their only proxy for judging costs and benefits and
hence the extent to which the rules in force promote satisfaction of
human preferences.97 Pefialver convincingly demonstrates the inade-
quacy of market value as the supreme metric for property. He shows,
for example, why residents in a gentrifying neighborhood may ration-
ally oppose gentrification even if it substantially increases the market
value of their land.98 Efficiency theorists tend to treat such reactions
as irrational, but Pefialver shows that the complexity of human motiva-
tion requires attention to plural, incommensurable values that cannot
be reduced to a simple, common metric. 99
Like Alexander and Pefialver, I have argued the inadequacy of
efficiency approaches to property rights.100 Efficiency theorists be-
lieve that the only way to think clearly and rationally about rule
choices is to consider their consequences and to compare their costs
and benefits. To the contrary, efficiency analysis is actually premised
on a controversial version of a controversial moral theory. First, effi-
ciency analysts tend not to count any interests that cannot be con-
verted to dollar amounts. In so doing, they leave off the table
fundamental human concerns that most people think matter in form-
ing law and social policy.
Second, efficiency analysts judge the presence and magnitude of
costs and benefits by reference to satisfaction of human preferences.
They do so because they assume that we have no objective basis for
judging preferences and that any such judgments interfere with both
autonomy and equality by imposing the values of some on others.101
However, no one actually thinks that all preferences are equal. Some
preferences count as human values that are preferred in any calculus
of costs and benefits. Moreover, some preferences should not be
counted at all: other-regarding, harmful preferences, such as the de-
sire to refuse to sell a house to someone because of their race, do not
or should not count in any social calculus of costs and benefits. The
goal of efficiency analysis is to promote autonomy and equality, but, as
Will Kymlicka explains, we must interpret what it means to live an
autonomous life and to treat each person equally. Counting the
97 See id.
98 See id. at 842-44.
99 See id. at 850-53.
100 See, e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY
(2000);Joseph William Singer, Normative Methods for Lawyers, 56 UCLA L. REv. (forthcom-
ing 2009) (manuscript at 15-22, on file with author).
101 For critiques of this view, see Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, In Defense of Redistribution
Through Private Law, 91 MINN. L. REv. 326, 330-31 (2006); Singer, supra note 100 (manu-
script at 17);Joseph William Singer, SomethingImportant in Humanity, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 103, 113-19 (2002).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1009
DEMOCRATIC ESTATES
desires of those who seek to exclude persons from public life on a
racial basis denies the very reason why we are counting preferences in
the first place and thus arguably should not count at all in normative
analysis. 102
Third, to say that we are prohibiting racial discrimination in the
housing market because its costs outweigh its benefits (a proposition
that may or may not be true if we count the preferences of racists) is
to give an irrelevant reason for prohibiting race discrimination. It
pretends that we are indifferent on the matter; we are skeptical, ra-
tional scientists simply trying to figure out what people think, so we
can give them what they want. We have no views on the matter and
make no judgments. But to say that we passed the Fair Housing Act
(FHA) because discrimination was simply too costly (it just wasn't
worth it) is to use inappropriate rhetoric; more than that, it is to state
a reason that is offensive. We passed the FHA not because the costs of
discrimination exceeded its benefits, but because we came to the con-
clusion that we do not want to live in an apartheid society. We regu-
late race discrimination in the housing market because it is wrong, not
because it reduces social welfare.
Finally, efficiency analysis fails to confront our need to make
qualitative distinctions among considerations, to speak of values and
not just preferences, to make judgments of worth central to normative
reflection.' 03 We are interested, or we should be interested, not just
in maximizing something (like wealth, welfare, well-being, or even
human flourishing) but in interpreting what it means to create a free
and democratic society that treats each person with equal concern
and respect. Because the moral and political philosophy on which
efficiency analysis is based is flawed, we need some way to talk about
justice, fairness, morality, liberty, and equality that is more nuanced,
less quantitative and more qualitative, and better attuned to mature
ethical reflection. Hence, Professor Pefialver suggests that we use vir-
tue ethics to think through the contours of an acceptable property
system.' 0 4 Alexander suggests we focus on human flourishing and the
scope of legitimate social obligations. 0 5 Jedediah Purdy suggests that
we think through the complex meaning of liberty in the American
102 WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION (2d ed.
2002).
103 See generally Joseph William Singer, Critical Normativity, LAW & CRITIQUE (forthcom-
ing 2009), available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/kkx784526925u220/?p=051 f
026194bb46af92a3610c5e2e9531&pi=4 (discussing the weaknesses of efficiency analysis).
104 See generally Pefialver, supra note 96 (proposing a virtue ethics system of property).
105 See Alexander, supra note 92, at 748 ("[T] he version of the social-obligation norm
that I develop here is morally superior to other candidates .... because it best promotes
human flourishing....").
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tradition and shape property law to enhance that vision of liberty.' 0 6
All these suggestions emerge from limitations in efficiency analysis as
a normative framework.
D. The Libertarian Approach
In recent years, libertarian thought has powerfully reemerged in
the political sphere (witness the candidacies of Ron Paul and Bob
Barr in the 2008 presidential race). It is evident in litigation brought
by public interest groups and figures in prominent Supreme Court
cases, such as the Kelo decision. 10 7 We can see its effect in some refer-
enda, such as Measure 37 in Oregon10 8 and Proposition 207 in Ari-
zona,10 9 that limited the enforceability of many land-use regulations.
Libertarianism has also reemerged among some law professors, such
as Randy Barnett and Richard Epstein."10 This new popularity of lib-
ertarianism can be attributed, to some extent, to a discomfort with
cost-benefit analysis and its associated philosophy of utilitarianism. If
liberty is a primary value, then the rights we cherish should not be put
up for grabs simply because someone can show that the market costs
of protecting those rights outweigh their benefits as measured in dol-
lar terms. This worry is especially strong in a time when civil liberties
are in jeopardy in our desire to protect ourselves from attacks by ter-
rorists. It is the precise refusal of cost-benefit theorists to make value
judgments that worries libertarians; without a normative framing
other than maximizing satisfaction of preferences, there is arguably
no limit to government power and no check on tyranny.
Libertarians respond to the critique of efficiency analysis by argu-
ing that owners should presumptively have the freedom to use their
property as they wish unless they actually harm others."' Govern-
106 See generally Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property: A Renewed Tra-
dition for New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 1237 (2005) (proposing a property system that
embraces individual freedom).
107 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
108 See Or. Ballot Measure 37 (codified at OR. REv. STAT. § 195.305 (West 2009)), avail-
able at http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/guide/meas/m37_text.html, super-
seded by Or. Ballot Measure 49 (codified in scattered sections of OR. REV. STAT.), available at
http://www.oregonvotes.org/nov62007/guide/m49_text.html.
109 See Private Property Rights Protection Act (codified at ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-
1131 to-38 (2009)).
110 See generally RANDY E. BARNEITr, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMP-
TION OF LIBERTY (2004); RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY. JUSTICE AND THE
RULE OF LAW (2000); RicHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995);
EPSTEIN, supra note 82.
111 See EPSTEIN, supra note 82, at 60 ("The idea of ownership entails that whatever uses
are permitted must fall within the exclusive province of the owner."). For such arguments
by a natural law theorist, see Claeys, Takings, Regulations, supra note 82, at 1567-68
("[E]very person 'has a right to exert those powers.., in such a manner, and upon such
objects, as his inclination and judgment shall direct; provided he does no injury to
others.'" (quoting JAMES WILSON, Lectures on Law, in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 69,
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ment regulations of property are justified only to prevent such harms.
What does this approach mean for the estates system? Professor Ep-
stein has argued that it generally means that we should deregulate
property agreements, allowing owners to place such conditions as they
like on their land. 112 As I noted earlier, this approach is therefore
deeply skeptical of the traditional estates system because it limits free-
dom of contract by requiring particular rights to be bundled together.
However, as I have explained, the libertarian conception of own-
ership masks underlying tensions. First, it is not clear that the free-
dom-of-contract idea applies equally to the problem of free
disposition. Owners who leave property in a will to their children do
not reach a mutually advantageous agreement; rather, they impose
restrictions on the donee who can either take it or leave it. We could
argue that the freedom to reject the bequest means that acceptance
suggests that the recipient is better off with a conditional bequest than
no bequest at all, but this response does not banish the problem that
conditions imposed unilaterally by donors on gift recipients or heirs
may have the effect of limiting the freedom of the recipient. More
fundamentally, the estates system arose as a response to feudalism. If
there were no limits on the conditions that could be placed on land
transfers, then there would be no legal barrier to the re-creation of
feudalism-a system of land ownership that is the very opposite of a
libertarian system.
It seems we cannot easily avoid the tension between the alienabil-
ity principle and the free contract/fee disposition principle, and it is
not clear how libertarian thought resolves this dispute. Several years
ago, my property law students discussed the problem faced by Justice
Clarence Thomas's father-in-law, Donald Lamp, when he posted an
American flag from his condominium balcony after 9/11.113 The con-
dominium association asked him to take it down because it had a rule
against any external adornments on the building, including flags, ban-
ners, structures, wind chimes, etc. Lamp refused to do so. I asked my
241-42 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967))); Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase, supra note 82,
at 23-24 ("Property... consists not so much of specific entitlements as a general domain
of practical discretion in relation to an external asset. That discretion protects in the
owner free choice how actively to use and enjoy the asset in relation to his own individual
needs.").
112 Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1353,1354 (1982) ("[T]he only need for public regulation, eitherjudicial or legisla-
tive, is to provide notice by recordation of the interests privately created.").
113 See Eric Olson, Supreme Court Justice's In-Laws Told to Remove Flag; "I'm Not About to,"
He Says, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 28, 2004, LexisNexis Academic; see also Tony Mauro, An
Unwelcome Matfor Free Speech, USA TODAY, Aug. 18, 2004, at 13A; Eric Olson, Father-in-Law of
High Court Justice Defies Rule, Flies Flag, ST. Louis POST-DIsPATCH, May 29, 2004, at 6, Lexis-
Nexis Academic.
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students what a libertarian would say about this issue. Luckily, I had
two articulate libertarians in my class.
The first libertarian said that Lamp should take down the flag.
He bought a home in a condominium and, in so doing, he implicitly
promised to abide by the rules of the association. This is freedom of
contract at work; there should be no government regulations limiting
the packages of property rights one can create. Indeed, if this is so,
the neighbors own the right to order him to take down the flag. If he
refuses to take it down, he is violating the property rights of his neigh-
bors, as well as breaking his own promise. Because libertarians are not
anarchists, this student believed it was perfectly appropriate for the
neighbors to call on the state to enforce their contract and property
rights by suing him, getting a court order to take down the flag, and
using state power to enforce their rights against him.
A second student-also a strong libertarian-became livid. "You
mean to tell me," he said, "that someone puts up an American flag on
his own home after the nation has been attacked by foreign enemies,
and you want the sheriff to come take it down? And you call yourself a
libertarian?" To this second student, enforcing such a rule was akin to
re-creating feudalism, allowing the neighbors to act like feudal lords,
controlling the day-to-day life of tenants on the land, depriving them
of autonomy, liberty, and equal rights. Indeed, in 2006, Congress
passed a law agreeing with this second student. The statute prohibits
enforcement of any condominium declaration or rule that bans a
home owner from displaying the American flag.114
It is not easy to resolve the conflict between these two views. Con-
sider the case of my friend who rents an apartment in a duplex in
Cambridge. She wanted to put an Obama sign in the front lawn, but
the landlord refused to let her. The federal statute does not protect
her. For one thing, the act protects the right to fly the American flag
but not the right to support candidates for public office. But further,
Congress apparently wanted to give rights to home owners but not to
tenants.' 15 This suggests that the one who has the right of free speech
is the "owner," not the "possessor," and that Congress views the unit
owner as the "owner" in the condominium complex (rather than view-
ing the owner as the unit owners acting collectively through the
114 See Freedom to Display the American Flag Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-243, 120 Stat.
572, 572 (2006) (codified as amended at 4 U.S.C. § 5 (2006)).
115 The operative portion of the statute states:
A condominium association, cooperative association, or residential real es-
tate management association may not adopt or enforce any policy, or enter
into any agreement, that would restrict or prevent a member of the associa-
tion from displaying the flag of the United States on residential property
within the association with respect to which such member has a separate
ownership interest or a right to exclusive possession or use.
Id. § 3.
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condo association) and as the landlord in the leasehold situation. But
determining who the "owner" is to determine whether a regulation of
land use is an intrusion on property rights or a protection of them
requires an exercise of judgment. And this judgment is not easily
solved by the libertarian injunction to deregulate property and pro-
mote freedom of contract.
We must make a qualitative judgment about whose interests the
law should be protect; the injunction to maximize "liberty" does not
get us all the way to solving the problem or justifying one solution
over another. The only way to resolve the problem is to make a nor-
mative judgment about the contours of our way of life. As Professor
Purdy demonstrates, liberty is not the same as the state of nature; it
describes a way of life that entails freedom within legitimate political,
social, and economic institutions. 116 Defining what it means to pro-
mote liberty requires qualitative judgments about human values, not
merely conceptual analysis of what it means to harm others. Just as
efficiency analysis reduces all human values to costs and benefits, lib-
ertarian analysis reduces all choices to freedom and coercion or to
distinguishing what is and is not a harm.
E. The Liberal Egalitarian Approach
I have argued, along with Professors Alexander and Pefialver, that
efficiency theorists flatten our values into mere preferences and fail to
consider qualitative distinctions among human interests. They also
fail to see that we judge preferences rather than merely seek to satisfy
them. I have also argued, with Professor Purdy, that the vision of lib-
erty promoted by libertarians is too simple to give us any help defining
the contours of legitimate property institutions. Are liberal egalitari-
ans any better at analyzing property? The answer: yes, but only a little.
Liberals are more comfortable with government regulation in
general and specifically government regulation of property. They un-
derstand the complexities involved in defining liberty. They also are
very focused on the concept of equal opportunity and understand
how the unjust origins of property rights have persistent effects over
time. Liberal egalitarians therefore focus on promoting widespread
access to property. Professor Underkuffler has eloquently explained
the difference between property rights and other kinds of rights. Free
speech may be necessary for democracy, but property, she reminds us,
is necessary for life itself. Moreover, although everyone can have free
speech if they take turns, the granting of property rights in a particu-
lar resource necessarily denies those property rights to others. 1 17
116 See Purdy, supra note 106, at 1259.
117 UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 65, at 125-27; Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Property: A
SpecialRight, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1033, 1039 (1996) ("The protection of property... is
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Property law therefore allocates something necessary for human life,
and in so doing, denies it to others. Only if the system of property law
allows every person to become an owner of the things needed for
human life can we be satisfied that property law has treated each per-
son with equal concern and respect.
The idea that every person must have access to the property sys-
tem has its origins in the Bible, where the Book of Leviticus requires
farmers to leave the corners of the field for the poor, the widow, and
the orphan.'" 8 In our political tradition, the idea originates in the
Lockean proviso that suggested that one may justify the possession of
land only if "there is enough, and as good left in common for
others."'1 9 In modern times, Frank Michelman has argued for welfare
rights on the Rawlsian ground that no one would accept a social
framework that did not make it realistically possible to become an
owner of the basic resources needed for human life.120 He has also
argued, agreeing with similar arguments by Jeremy Waldron, 12a that
we protect property rights to promote individual autonomy and wel-
fare and that, if we believe in equality, it must be that each person has
equal interests in obtaining the property necessary to promote their
own autonomy and welfare. 122 Because some sorts of property, such
as land, are limited in supply, there are externalities to very unequal
allocations of property. Protecting the right to exclude means, as Pro-
fessor Underkuffler reminds us, that owners are entitled to deny to
others things needed to sustain human life. 123 If we think protection
of property rights is important to individuals, and we think each indi-
vidual is equally entitled to the interests that property rights protect,
then we cannot be indifferent to the distribution of property rights. I
have similarly argued that we need to think of property and property
quite different [than the protection of free speech] .... The extension of property protec-
tion to one person necessarily and inevitably denies the same fight to others." (emphasis in
original)).
118 SeeJOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD: LESSONS ON THE OBLIGATIONS
OF OWNERSHIP 38-62 (2000).
119 2 LocKE, supra note 12, at 288.
120 See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REV. 7, 13-16 (1969) (discussing his
theory of "minimum protection against economic hazard" that includes the idea that "per-
sons are entitled to have certain wants satisfied... by government").
121 SeeJEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 287 (1988) (setting out a
general right-based theory of property).
122 See Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property,
72 IowA L. REV. 1319, 1329 (1987) (discussing the importance of property as a vehicle for
individual political and social power).
123 See Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 117, at 1040 ("Any scheme for the super-
majoritarian protection of the appropriations by some persons means, correspondingly,
the denial of the appropriation of the same goods, resources, and essentials of life by
others.").
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law not only as an individual right but as a system. 124 Just as we have
antitrust law to prevent the emergence of monopoly power, we need
laws that ensure that the allocation of property rights does not be-
come so lopsided as to deny to others the possibility of becoming an
owner.
These liberal egalitarian approaches get us closer to the core con-
cerns we should be focusing on. However, there are some limitations
in them as well. First, although the distribution of property is of cen-
tral importance, focusing on how much property each person has fails
to consider the kinds of social relationships that led to that distribu-
tion. For example, efficiency theorists tend to be indifferent as to the
source of property. Consider two people that have the same yearly
income. One has ajob at McDonald's and earns the money; the other
gets a welfare check. If the only thing we care about is the quantity of
money, these people are equally well off. But no one in America
thinks that we think only about amounts of property. We care about
its source. 125 Why do we care about this? Because we have norms
about self-respect, desert, and dependence that are implicated in
these situations. That means that the qualitative human relationships
that generate property rights must be at the center of our concern.
Professor Purdy powerfully illustrates this point by arguing that we
have qualitative limitations on "terms of recruitment," meaning the
terms on which we establish collaborative relations with others.
1 26
Sharecropping after the Civil War, combined with a failure to give
forty acres and a mule to the freed slaves, came close to reproducing
slavery. 127 If we did not use law to regulate the terms of recruitment, a
free society would be impossible to distinguish from one based on feu-
dalism, plantation slavery, or apartheid.
Second, the prevailing liberal approach to these questions is the
Rawlsian model. I have argued that this provides a useful lens with
which to address normative questions; that is because it forces us to
use something like a Golden Rule decision procedure. 128 Would you
like it if she did that to you? Would you be happy with these property
arrangements if you did not know which lot you would own? Would
you be content with the contract if you did not know on which side of
124 SINGER, supra note 100, at 140-78.
125 See Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 101, at 331 ("[T]he benefit people derive from
resources depends on complex factors, including the acts that generate the resources and
the source from which they are received.").
126 SeeJedediah Purdy, People as Resources: Recruitment and Reciprocity in the Freedom-Pro-
moting Approach to Property, 56 DuKE L.J. 1047, 1094-98 (2007).
127 See Aviam Soifer, Status, Contract, and Promises Unkept, 96 YALE L.J. 1916, 1929
(1987).
128 See Singer, supra note 100 (manuscript at 65, 71) (applying the Golden Rule to
normative questions).
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the bargaining table you would be sitting? But those who use the
Rawlsian approach (including John Rawls himself) tend to focus on
distributive questions rather than seeing the property system as part of
the basic structure of society that should be addressed not just as a
matter of economic distribution but of the nature of liberty. 129 Again,
qualitative judgments must be front and center, and the Rawlsian ap-
proach gets us only so far. It asks an extraordinarily useful question
by getting us to consider whether we would be happy with a particular
set up, not knowing what role we would be playing, but it does not yet
get us to core problem of making qualitative judgments about the
contours of social relationships with respect to property.
The third limitation of the liberal egalitarian approach is its focus
on individual rights. Rights are important, but so are obligations.
Sometimes, rights and obligations are opposite sides of the same coin,
but often they are very different ways to approach a problem. For
example, most states have enacted laws denying recognition to same-
sex marriages performed elsewhere. The debate about these laws re-
volves around the question of whether same-sex couples married in
Massachusetts (and now Connecticut) have a right to have their mar-
riages recognized elsewhere. This framing of the issue assumes that
the basic reason for civil marriage is to confer rights on the married
partners. But a cursory examination of the law of marriage shows that
marriage entails a host of obligations of mutual support, both during
the marriage and on its dissolution by death or divorce, and it also
entails obligations to support the couple's children. By authorizing
states to refuse to recognize marriages performed elsewhere, the fed-
eral Defense of Marriage Act' 30 allows married partners to flee Massa-
chusetts to other states and escape their obligations to support their
children and share their property with their spouses.' 3 1 Looking at
the problem by assuming that individuals have obligations as well as
rights, we can understand the social relationships embodied in the law
differently. This approach is both more accurate and better attuned
to well-considered moral judgments about the contours of property
rights in society. So liberal egalitarian approaches usefully focus our
129 For example, in his reformation of his position in Justice as Fairness, Rawls empha-
sizes that the fight to have personal property is necessary "for personal independence and
a sense of self-respect." JOHN RAWLS, JUsTICE As FURNESS: A RESTATEMENT 114 (Erin Kelly
ed., 2001). However, he does not analyze the role that property plays in structuring social
relationships and thus emphasizes an individual conception of liberty rather than the idea
of a citizen of a free and democratic society in which property is related, not only to indi-
vidual powers, but to just social relations. Id. For discussion of a conception of freedom
that recognizes the structural role that property plays in a free and democratic society, see
generally Purdy, supra note 126.
130 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
131 See generally Joseph 'William Singer, Same Sex Marriage, Full Faith and Credit, and the
Evasion of Obligation, 1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1 (2005).
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attention on distributive issues, but they do not adequately address
qualitative judgments about social relationships and obligations.
F. The Personality, Human Flourishing, Capabilities, and Virtue
Ethics Approaches
A number of approaches do focus on qualitative judgments about
the interests protected by property law. The dean of this approach is
MargaretJane Radin, who has argued that we must distinguish among
types of property based on the meaning of the property to the owner
and the character of the relationship between the owner and the
property.' 3 2 Professor Radin suggests we think about what forms of
property are central to personality and that we distinguish between
property that has emotional content and normative import for us
(such as weddings rings and the family home) from property that is
fungible and of value to us simply because of the market power it rep-
resents. When a dispute involves personal property on one side and
fungible property on the other, she suggests we put a thumb on the
scale by protecting the interests that we cannot reduce to dollar
amounts.13 3 Radin has also usefully considered the limitations of
commodification: certain rights should not be traded in the market-
place, which means that certain property rights cannot be recognized
at all while others can be protected only by refusing to treat them as
market commodities.1 34
Professor Radin's work stands as an interesting counterpart to the
recent work of Professors Merrill and Smith because she gives differ-
ent reasons than they do as to why the law cannot legitimately recog-
nize certain packages of property rights. She argues that the law
cannot recognize some property interests without harm to our hu-
manity. Human flourishing should be the central goal of property
law, and this requires consideration of the legitimacy of interests and
the qualitative externalities of converting particular interests into mar-
ket commodities. 135 Professor Alexander similarly proposes human
flourishing as a useful normative lens through which to think about
the goals of property law.1 36
In a similar vein, Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum have pro-
posed that we think about central human capabilities in order to rea-
132 MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 35-71 (1993).
133 See id.
134 MARGARETJANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES: THE TROUBLE WITH TRADE IN SEX,
CHILDREN, BODY PARTS, AND OTHER THINGS 1-15 (paperback ed. 2001) (discussing the lim-
its of market rhetoric).
135 Id. at 79-101.
136 See Alexander, supra note 92, at 748 (proposing a social-obligation norm system of
property because such a system is most likely to promote human flourishing).
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son normatively about property structures. 13 7 Rather than just trying
to ensure that the distribution of property is sufficiently equal, they
ask us to think about what equality means through normative reason-
ing about what human beings should be able to do with their lives.
Identifying those capabilities may help us think about what quantity
and type of property each person should have in order to exercise
their capabilities. That may affect how we organize social and eco-
nomic life to ensure that human capabilities can be developed for
each person. Finally, Professor Pefialver identifies virtue ethics as the
appropriate normative lens for thinking about property law.138 His
proposal is a major advance because it focuses our attention on obliga-
tions we have to others rather than just rights we can claim.
I am sympathetic to all these approaches. It is important to no-
tice, however, that Alexander and Pefialver focus on something that is
marginalized in the personality and capabilities approaches. Both Al-
exander and Pefialver ask us to think about the legitimate contours of
the social relationships within which human needs are defined and
satisfied. Again, suppose we describe two different societies, one that
is regulated by racial segregation laws and the other by fair housing,
employment, and public-accommodation laws. Both societies may sat-
isfy material wants of persons and give them "equal capabilities" in
some sense, but the character of the social relationships is very differ-
ent. One might be able to fold these considerations back into the
personality and capabilities theories. My point is that we should
center our attention on the character of the society in which we are
defining property rights. Property law involves relations among peo-
ple; more broadly, it defines a particular social, economic, and politi-
cal structure. This is what Alexander so powerfully reminds us of by
linking property to conceptions of social order. And this is what
Pefialver so eloquently points out by explaining that something is lost
in a gentrifying neighborhood that cannot be compensated by dollars.
IV.
THE DEMOCRATIC MODEL OF PROPERTY LAW
How then should we think about property if we are interested in
the qualitative character of social relationships? Professors Pefialver
and Alexander are leading the charge in creating a new school of
thought about property law. Their work, along with that of Professors
137 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OFJUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEM-
BERSHIP 155 (2006); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999); AMARTYA SEN, RA-
TIONALITY AND FREEDOM 206-20 (2002); Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in THE
QUALITY OF LIE 30 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993) (explaining the capabil-
ity approach as a comprehensive approach to social advantage).
138 See generally Pefialver, supra note 96.
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Underkuffler, Purdy, and myself, among others, approaches property
law by focusing on understanding the role that property and property
law play in a free and democratic society that treats each person with
equal concern and respect. Because this approach asks what property
and property law look like in a democracy, we might call this the demo-
cratic model of property law. What are the features of this approach?
The democratic model entails fundamental analytical insights, core
substantive norms, and an approach to normative methods.
A. Analytical Insights
1. Relations Among Persons
The democratic approach recognizes that property law concerns
not just relations between persons and things but relations among per-
sons with respect to valued resources. 139 While modern property law
theorists have long recognized this legal realist insight, it has not been
given the prominence that it should have in property theory. We
more often pay lip service to this idea rather than think through its
full implications.
Every legal right should be understood not merely by reference
to the powers and rights it gives the owner but by reference to the
impacts of the exercise of those powers on others and the shape and
character of the social relationships engendered by those rights and
powers. Professor Hohfeld restated legal rights as 'jural relations," di-
recting our attention to the correlatives of rights; he insisted that we
think about how others are affected when a legal right is recognized
and exercised.1 40 Giving an owner the right to exclude affects others
by imposing on them a duty to stay off the owner's land. The freedom
to use one's land as one wishes affects others by making them vulnera-
ble to the effects of one's actions. 4 1
We need not only understand rights as relationships; we need to
consider the qualitative character of those relationships as well. For
example, the libertarian and efficiency schools consider voluntary
deals to be mutually beneficial, welfare-promoting arrangements.
When a bank offers to lend money to help someone buy a home, for
example, these schools assume that the bank is offering the potential
borrower a free choice; accepting the offer shows that both parties are
better off with the deal than without it, and the resulting contract is
therefore necessarily legitimate.
139 See generally SINGER, supra note 100, at 6 ("The recognition and exercise of property
rights affects the interests of others, including other owners and nonowners.").
140 Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 76, at 28-32.
141 See id.
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But this conclusion is too facile. Whether the relationship is legit-
imate depends on a moral judgment that the relationship is accept-
able in a free and democratic society. After all, they could agree to a
master/slave relationship or a lord/vassal relationship. In a free and
democratic society, some relationships are out of bounds; this means
that some contract terms are off the table. There are some things you
should not ask of others; there are some demands that cannot justly
be made in a free and democratic society. When a mortgage lender
offers onerous terms to someone who is desperate to become a home
owner and get a share in the American Dream, that lender is not
merely giving that person a choice; she is offering to establish an ex-
ploitative relationship while misleading the buyer/borrower into
thinking that the terms are acceptable. The fact that the buyer/bor-
rower accepts such terms of recruitment does not mean that they are
therefore legitimate. Because legal rights entail relations among per-
sons, we cannot figure out what to think about the legitimacy (both
moral and legal) of the relationship without attending to, and making
a judgment about, the qualitative aspects of the relationship.
2. Obligations, Externalities, and the Duty of Attentiveness
Because property law concerns relations among people, property
owners have obligations as well as rights.1 42 Because both the alloca-
tion and the exercise of property rights affect others, we are not free
to ignore the externalities of property.' 43 Indeed, property law is pre-
mised on a core principle apparent as well in contract and tort law: we
have an obligation of attentiveness. 144 We are not free to ignore the
effects of our actions on others; to the contrary, the common law re-
quires us to pay attention to the immediate and not-so-immediate con-
sequences of our actions, otherwise known as externalities.1 45 Those
externalities may be of various kinds; we are not only concerned with
the fair market value of property but the character of the neighbor-
hood in which property is situated. As Professor Pefialver argues, gen-
142 See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 74, at 2 (discussing the "political-legal principle
in proprietarian thought that when individuals fail to meet their precontractual social obli-
gations, the state may legitimately compel them to act for the good of the entire commu-
nity"); SINGER, svpra note 100, at 16 ("[O]wners have obligations as well as rights."
(emphasis omitted)).
143 See Singer, supra note 71, at 3.
144 Singer, supra note 28 (manuscript at 8) ("All the basic areas of law governing the
market system, including tort, contract, and property law, rest on the idea that we are
obligated to attend to the effects our actions have on others.").
145 See id. (manuscript at 8) ("The law of property is not indifferent to the effects of
exercising property rights nor on the structure of those rights themselves.").
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trification may increase property values in the neighborhood yet still
be resisted by owners who fear a loss of their way of life. 146
At the same time, we do make judgments about the legitimacy of
complaints that individuals make when they are affected by the exer-
cise of property rights. Sometimes we deem those claims to be illegiti-
mate. 147 An owner may object to the fact that you painted your house
green, but we do not, in general, give neighbors veto rights over their
neighbors' house colors, unless all the neighbors agreed to abide by
the decisions of a homeowners association on such matters. The
choice of house color is legitimately viewed as a self-regarding act-
not because others are not affected by your paint choice but because
others have no legitimate interest in limiting your paint choices. We
have obligations to avoid actions that harm the legitimate interests of
others, if possible. Although this sometimes means limiting our free-
dom in order to protect the security of the neighbors, at other times it
means deferring to the ability of others to make choices for them-
selves even though their actions impinge on our sensibilities. You may
object to the Obama sign on my front lawn, but you have no legiti-
mate complaint about its presence there; you have no moral or legal
right to insist that I take it down.
3. Property as a Social System
The democratic approach to property understands property not
merely as an individual right but a social system. 148 We cannot under-
stand property law without understanding the social relationships it
embodies and promotes. To understand our working estates system,
we must look beyond legal categories to both social custom and legis-
lation setting the boundaries of allowable social relationships. As Pro-
fessor Purdy explains in his forthcoming book, Aspects of Mastery:
Property, Freedom, and the Legal Imagination, we must "understand a legal
institution within that context of social practices" and "the image of
common life in which the law is set."149 Property law is part of the way
we define a legitimate social order. This means that certain property
arrangements are defined as out of bounds. While the particular
rules embodied in the estates system may be outmoded historical
leftovers rather than embodiments of contemporary values, the idea
146 See Pefialver, supra note 96, at 831-32 ("Land's memory, and the attachments on
which it depends, also shed light on the ambiguous status of gentrification, helping to
explain why communities frequently (and sometimes almost reflexively) resist change,
even when they stand to gain financially from the process." (footnote omitted)).
147 See Singer, supra note 71, at 2.
148 See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 74, at 311-51; SINGER, supra note 100, at95-139.
149 JEDEDIAH PURDY, ASPECTS OF MASTERY: PROPERTY, FREEDOM, AND THE LEGAL IMAGINA-
TION (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at xii, on file with author).
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of the estates system reflects a persisting norm that defines certain
property arrangements as incompatible with our way of life.
When we combine this insight with the idea that we must attend
to the externalities of property, we see that we cannot conclude that a
particular set of property rules or institutions is acceptable unless we
attend to the systemic effects of exercising those property rights. For
example, you have no legitimate claim to sleep in my house without
my consent; my ability to control access to my house is part of my
ability to have a safe and comfortable home. However, if every person
has the right to exclude others from his home, and if there is no place
that a homeless person is allowed to sleep, then the allocation and
exercise of the right to exclude has the cumulative effect of making it
illegal for homeless persons to sleep anywhere. The right to exclude
can only be legitimately asserted in such circumstances if there are
places that homeless people are allowed to be. 150 The shape and qual-
ity of human relationships should be at the core of our concern in
determining whether a set of property rights can be accepted as legiti-
mate in a free and democratic society.
4. Bundled Rights
Property is not only comprised of "bundles of rights" but is de-
fined by a set of "bundled rights." As Professors Merrill and Smith
explain, the estates system limits the packages of rights that the legal
system will recognize.' 5 ' It does so in order to ensure that property
institutions are compatible with our form of life. The reason we do
not allow complete freedom of contract with respect to property is
because many forms of property contradict values that shape the con-
tours of social relationships in a free and democratic society. Our es-
tates system is not limited to the rules defining the technicalities of
future interests; our working estates system reflects more fundamen-
tal, normative judgments about social life. 152 We live in a particular
kind of society with particular economic, social, and political struc-
tures and practices. We can call our society a democracy. What are
the implications of a democratic society for property and property
law? The primary implication is that some packages of property rights
must be illegal in a free and democratic society. If this is so, what
would democratic estates look like? This requires us to consider some
150 See Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. REv. 295,
300-01 (1991).
151 Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 44, at 12-14.
152 See id. at 14 (noting that courts may choose an appropriate characterization of an
estate based on what "is most consistent with the testator's intentions or is otherwise 'best'
in terms of policy concerns such as promoting the free alienability of property").
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substantive limitations on the packages of rights property law will rec-
ognize. How do we do that?
B. Substantive Norms
1. The Features of a Free and Democratic Society
We can begin by thinking about what a democratic society is not.
A democracy is not a monarchy; it is not a feudal society; it is not a
slave society; it is not an aristocracy or oligarchy; it is not apartheid, or
racially segregated, or a caste, or "corporate" society defined by inher-
ited social statuses; it is not a male-dominated society. The quotes at
the beginning of this Essay suggest the outer limits of property rights
in a democracy. We have abolished feudalism; we are skeptical about
the "company town" that confers power over all the town's land in a
business corporation rather than a homeowners association or town
government. We do not allow farm owners to treat workers as serfs or
indentured servants or peasants who can be isolated from contact with
others. Our property law system thus outlaws the creation of property
rights that enact such prohibited social and political relationships.
We tend to forget this fundamental purpose of the estates system
because custom has evolved so that no one seeks to create feudal or
slave relationships today. For that reason, we tend to take for granted
that our society does not exhibit or allow those property arrange-
ments. Because my students, for example, generally were born in the
early-to-mid 1980s, they take for granted that restaurants cannot ex-
clude patrons based on their race. 153 But because I was born in 1954,
I do not take this for granted; I remember when that kind of property
arrangement was not only legal but mandatory in some states. Demo-
cratic estates place limits on the contours of the relationships that can
be legitimately established with regard to control of land and other
forms of property.
Some rules of law that accomplish these ends are formal, such as
the rule abolishing the fee tail and the Thirteenth Amendment's pro-
hibition on slavery. Some are based on general common law values
such as the prohibition on the creation of "new estates. 1 54 Many of
these prohibitions are not formalized in law because social custom has
evolved so that no one would think of creating such property interests.
Our property law system operates with a combination of formal rules
and social customs to shape property rights in a manner consistent
with the norms of a free and democratic society. The estates system
and the numerus clausus principle championed by Merrill and Smith
outlaw particular packages of legal rights with respect to property.
153 See, e.g., CAL. Ctv. CODE §§ 51-51.3 (West 2007).
154 Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 44, at 4.
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But they do so not only to lower the information costs of determining
who the owner is, but to shape social life in a manner consistent with
the normative commitments of a democratic society composed of free
and equal individuals who treat each other respectfully. Property law
therefore both reflects and puts into practice value judgments about
the appropriate contours of social, economic, and political life.
2. Minimum-Standards Regulations
The democratic model of property law recognizes that market re-
lationships are legitimate only if they comply with minimum-standards
regulations that ensure that individuals treat each other with common
decency.' 55 Libertarians and efficiency theorists may be skeptical of
all government regulations, but the American people demand laws
that ensure that property relationships protect justified expectations,
and they justifiably expect property to be used in a manner that is
consistent with the obligation to treat others with dignity. Thus, we
have consumer protection laws to ensure that property does not harm
us and that it does what the sellers claim it will do. We have antidis-
crimination laws to ensure that we can participate in public economic
and social life without regard to race or religion or disability. We have
antitrust laws to ensure that markets do not become monopolized.
We have zoning laws to ensure protection from incompatible neigh-
boring uses. We have environmental laws so that we are protected
from pollution and so that our children may inherit a world that is
livable. We regulate insurance and banking so that our money will be
there when we need it. We have an estates system to ensure that we
have adequate rights with respect to our own property. And we have
the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, passed on July 30,
2008, to help foreclosure victims keep their homes and restructure
their mortgages to make them affordable.' 56
The traditional approach to the estates system focuses on com-
mon law regulation of future interests and servitudes. A contempo-
rary understanding of the operation of the estates system must look as
well to the numerous statutes that regulate the contours of market
relationships, especially fair housing laws, consumer protection stat-
utes, zoning, land use, mortgage and foreclosure laws, environmental
laws, and marital property laws. It is a mistake to think about property
law in a manner that is divorced from these statutory regulations. We
use a combination of common law, statutes, and social custom to de-
fine the boundaries of allowable packages of property rights, and we
will better understand the function of property law in our economic
155 See Singer, supra note 40, at 141-42 ("W]e should recognize that all contracts are
subject to regulations that set minimum standards for economic and social relationships.").
156 Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654 (2008).
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and legal system if we broaden our concept of estates to include the
entire social and legal structure that defines the property-rights
system.
C. Normative Methods
1. Political and Moral Theory
In thinking about property and property law, we cannot confine
ourselves to the techniques of economic theory or cost-benefit analy-
sis. Rather, we must look to basic moral and political theory for the
normative frameworks that economic theory lacks.1 57 Although eco-
nomic analysis of property rights appears to be the dominant ap-
proach in law schools these days, the utilitarian moral theory on which
it is based is generally regarded by moral and political philosophers as
fatally flawed-at least unless it is supplemented or cabined by norma-
tive analyses of other kinds, such as considerations of justice, fairness,
obligations, and ethics. 158 The only form of utilitarian analysis that
has strong support among moral theorists these days is a morally con-
strained utilitarianism; preference-based theories are generally
deemed defective unless they focus on idealized preferences-what
preferences would be if perfectly informed and chosen in a suitable
decision setting. Moral theorists espouse a variety of ways of thinking
about right conduct but almost all of them ask us to consider the ways
that our actions affect others and the extent to which we could justify
our actions to those affected by them. 159 Cost-benefit analysis fails to
meet this basic test because it fails to respect the separateness of per-
sons, each of whom is entitled to be treated with equal concern and
respect.
Moreover, political theorists wrestle with the question of how to
structure a society of free and equal persons with differing concep-
tions of the good. Liberty and justice in such a society can only be
established by fair ground rules for exercising political and economic
power. Political and moral theory, as well as sophisticated economic
theory, requires us to judge the legitimacy of individual interests and
the shape of basic institutional structures. We do not take preferences
merely as given, partly because some preferences are illegitimate in a
democracy and partly because preferences are shaped by law and cus-
tom. Moreover, markets are not states of nature; they are regulated by
law, and the legal rules defining property rights are a major element
'57 Singer, supra note 100 (manuscript at 6) ("We lawyers have borrowed liberally from
economic theory; it is time to extend our reach to political and moral theory in an equally
sustained way.").
158 I have explained this in depth in Singer, supra note 100 (manuscript at 15-22).
159 See generally CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD ET AL., THE SOURCES OF NORMATIVITV (1996);
T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 147-68 (1998).
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of that regulation. One cannot ask what the market solution to a
problem is without first defining the legal parameters of market insti-
tutions and economic relationships. It is circular to ask economic
analysis to define property rights when one needs to define property
rights first to determine what market transactions will emerge. There
is no escape from the need to use some other form of analysis, such as
political and moral theory, to define and shape the basic structure of
society. Political theory supports the idea of creating a democracy
that respects fundamental human rights. This institutional setting
forms the background within which the market can operate, not the
reverse.
2. Plural Values
The democratic model of property recognizes that property
serves plural values and that law should reflect those multiple val-
ues.' 60 Property gives us freedom and stability, provides a source of
wealth and well-being, the bases for creative work and useful invest-
ment. Property provides a place to create a family life, to nurture
friendships, to rest, and to have fun. Property allows us to be good
neighbors and good citizens, and it promotes various human values,
including privacy, the freedom to associate with others, religious lib-
erty, tranquility, and peace of mind. It is a mistake to try to reduce
values to a single metric such as wealth, utility, well-being, welfare, or
even liberty. We care about qualitative distinctions among values, not
just the extent to which our preferences are satisfied. As both Profes-
sors Pefialver and Purdy so eloquently argue, the more nuanced lan-
guage of values allows us to think more deeply about our multiple
concerns and to reason normatively about the scope of property rights
and the nature of the obligations of ownership. 161
The qualitative character of social relationships, rather than mere
maximization of market value, should be at the core of our concern.
Most things we care about cannot be adequately expressed in terms of
price. And market values are useful indicators of value only if they are
set within the boundaries defined by rules that shape the contours of
legitimate social relationships. Market values are useful indicators
only if their limitations as a normative metric are recognized.
What are the normative features of property law in a free and
democratic society? We value autonomy; individuals must have the
freedom to determine the shape of their own lives, in a manner con-
sistent with a similar freedom for others. Thus, they cannot be forced
to remain on the family homestead or pressed into the family business
160 See generaUy ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993); PURDY,
supra note 149; Alexander, supra note 92; Pefialver, supra note 96; Singer, supra note 100.
161 PURDY, supra note 149; Pefialver, supra note 96.
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against their will. We value mobility; people should not be "tied to the
land" and prevented from moving to another place, taking another
job, or forming new family and friendships and business relations.
Thus, we view restraints on alienation of property with a highly skepti-
cal eye. We value widespread distribution of property and realistic po-
tential for access to ownership. Thus, we enact laws to promote equal
opportunity. We create public schools and we prohibit discrimination
in housing, employment, and public accommodations. We value free-
dom of contract but we also ensure that market participants comply
with minimum standards for economic and social relationships. Thus,
we have consumer protection statutes, the implied warranty of habita-
bility, and workplace safety laws. We feel obligations to each other in
times of need, so we have unemployment compensation, Social Secur-
ity, Medicare, and disaster relief. We value both stability and change
so we allow easements and covenants to be created but we limit the
veto rights of easement owners by denying injunctive relief and rele-
gating owners to damages or using doctrines of frustration or of
changed conditions to allow easements to be modified. We allow
homeowners associations to adopt various rules governing the use of
property but we allow rules to be changed by majority vote so that
individuals do not exercise too much power over their neighbors in
preventing desirable change. Different property rules and regulations
serve different purposes, and some serve multiple purposes. The plu-
ral values we hold underlie those regulations and definitions of prop-
erty rights.
3. Plural Methods
In analyzing the legitimate contours of social relationships in a
democracy, we need not limit ourselves to a single method of norma-
tive reasoning. 162 Indeed, a variety of normative frameworks are use-
ful-yes, including economic analysis, but also including Rawlsian
theory, narrative and literary theory, deontological theory, historical
analysis, balancing of interests, virtue ethics, elaboration of human val-
ues, deconstruction, and rhetorical theory. We have rich resources
for thinking about, criticizing, judging, and justifying rules choices,
and institutional frameworks and various methods can both give us
insight and constrain our choices so as to avoid injustice to the extent
possible.
D. What Difference Does it Make?
What implications does the democratic model of property have
for specific cases? Consider the question of whether a tenant has the
162 See, e.g., Singer, supra note 100.
2009] 1055
CORNELL LAW REVEW
right to post a sign supporting Obama or McCain in the front yard of
a rented house. How should we think about this question?
Efficiency theorists suggest we should figure out the result that
maximizes satisfaction of preferences as measured by market values.
If the tenant values the right to post signs on the property, she should
bargain for it; if the landlord refuses, we have evidence that the costs
to the landlord outweigh the benefits to the tenant. Transaction costs
are not likely to be high here, nor are externalities since the tenant
can support her preferred candidate in other ways. And we can ex-
pect no different result if we created a default rule that individuals
have a right to post such signs: landlords who do not like this will
simply bargain around it. And we can save both bargaining and infor-
mation costs by limiting the rights of tenants and letting them know
that if they want access to someone else's land, they need to bargain
for the terms they want. This leaves the specification of rights to the
private marketplace (the bargaining of the parties) rather than the
inefficient litigation process whereby judges try to approximate the
welfare-maximizing result.
Libertarians will make similar but even stronger arguments.
Owners have no duties to rent to tenants, and they have the right to
determine the terms on which tenants access their land. The law
should not prevent the parties from making the contracts that serve
their mutual interests. Liberal egalitarians may be worried about de-
nying tenants the right to engage in expressive speech, but it is not
clear that they have a good answer to the question of why the tenant's
right to post a sign is more important than the landlord's right to
keep the property free of such signs, especially if the landlord sup-
ports a different candidate for President. They may argue that tenants
have unequal bargaining power and that if tenants had sufficient mar-
ket power, they would be unlikely to give up the right to engage in the
political process in this manner. But this argument assumes that we
know what bargains would occur in the absence of unequal market
power, and such predictive claims are hard to back up; they seem
much more based on substantive judgments about the relative impor-
tance of the parties' interests than a real prediction of what bargains
would be reached if property were distributed differently. In other
words, this "prediction" seems to mask or be based on a judgment
about which interest is more important in a democratic society. Such
a judgment goes beyond considerations of distributive justice; it re-
quires discussion of qualitative differences among interests and the
legitimate contours of the good society.
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Professor Radin's personality theory does allow us to discuss qual-
itative distinctions; 163 the right to put up a political sign is associated
with core elements of personality and humanity, and we could argue
that individuals should not be forced to give up such rights. This sug-
gests that the tenant's personal interest in posting the sign outweighs
the landlord's fungible interest in protecting the market value of the
property. At the same time, landlords may have personal interests in
the appearance of their property, especially if the property is owner
occupied. And, like tenants, landlords have personal interests in not
having their property used to support candidates they do not support.
Why should the tenant's interest outweigh the landlord's interest?
The answer might be that the landlord can put up a sign on his own
house. He does not have the right to also put up signs at property he
has rented to others, nor may he deprive tenants of similar rights.
This requires, however, a substantive judgment that landlords should
not be allowed to treat rental property the same as they treat their
homes. What is the basis of this conclusion? It rests on a notion of
equality, but it also depends on an assumption about the liberties that
property law both enables and constrains.
The personality theory asks us to look at how property is con-
nected to personality, but it also suggests that we consider whether it is
legitimate for landlords to claim the right to treat their business prop-
erty in the same way they treat their personal property.164 A landlord,
for example, may wish to discriminate on the basis of race in his
choice of tenants; this may even go to the core of his sense of himself.
Racially segregated property is not fungible with integrated property
in the mind of a racist landlord. But our system outlaws this arrange-
ment regardless of the strength of the landlord's preference. This is
because we judge this arrangement to be beyond the contours of al-
lowable social relationships in a free and democratic society.
In contrast to traditional approaches, the democratic model of
property focuses our attention on the need to make normative judg-
ments about the appropriate contours of property relationships in a
free and democratic society.' 65 We may do this on a number of levels.
We would first ask whether denying someone the right to put up a
political sign on her property violates basic norms governing social,
political, and economic relationships in a polity that treats each per-
son with equal concern and respect. Even if we do not consider this
to be a basic human right (whether or not based in the First Amend-
ment or other aspects of constitutional law), we should still consider
whether such a regulation should be imposed as a matter of consumer
163 See RADIN, supra note 132, at 35-71.
164 See id.
165 See supra 1047-55.
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protection law, either because it protects justified expectations or be-
cause it accords with settled convictions about rights that ought to go
along with possession of land.
The law gives us some guidance here. Courts have interpreted
the First Amendment to give home owners the freedom to post signs
on their property, although towns can regulate the size and appear-
ance of those signs.166 This means that any city ordinances that pre-
vent owners from putting up a sign supporting Obama or McCain for
President are unenforceable; assuming the Supreme Court was cor-
rect in its decision in City of Ladue v. Gilleo, such laws are incompatible
with the basic framework of a free and democratic society. 167
The question then is whether owners should be free to waive
those protections when they buy property regulated by a homeowners
association or when they take a lease to an apartment. 168 Can we view
those waivers as freely negotiated agreements, and if so, should they
be enforceable by state action through court enforcement? Do we
value the rights of landlords and neighbors to live in a setting without
such signs more than we value the right to post signs relevant to politi-
cal contests? Do the landlord's aesthetic interests outweigh the ten-
ant's political interests? Is the landlord's desire to refuse to allow
signs supporting candidates the landlord opposes a legitimate one
that the legal system should respect when it would prevent tenants
from exercising similar rights?
These questions revolve around a core normative issue: Is the
right to post a political sign on one's property one of those self-evi-
dent inalienable rights that democracies should recognize? Or should
tenants be free to give up such rights in return for other benefits?
Answering these questions requires us to make substantive choices
about the interests at stake, the values those interests implicate, the
relative strength, relevance, and cogency of those values in particular
social settings, the social relationships that will result from the choice
of legal rule, the opportunities that will be enabled or cut off, and the
relation between property rights and political and social life. A
calculus of economic costs and benefits is wholly inadequate as a way
to analyze these questions. Indeed, I believe it would be irrational to
analyze this legal issue by assigning dollar amounts to the relevant in-
terests and seeing how the math comes out.
166 See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58-59 (1994) (holding that Ladue's ban on
almost all residential signs violates the First Amendment).
167 See id.
168 See Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners' Ass'n, 890 A.2d
947 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (questioning whether the authority of a community
association is limited by the expressive rights guarantee in the New Jersey Constitution),
rev'd, 929 A.2d 1060 (N.J. 2007).
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There are various ways to think through and justify alternative
resolutions to these questions. None of them gives us a mechanical
decision procedure to generate an outcome. They include, for exam-
ple, exercises in framing the issue; telling the story; balancing the par-
ties' interests; defining the values of a free and democratic society;
asking what rule we would favor if we did not know whether we would
be the landlord or the tenant; considering the legitimate scope of ob-
ligations we have to others as equal human beings; considering our
national history and customs; and evaluating the availability of alterna-
tive means of expressing political support for candidates. 169 We must
also consider the consequences of adopting one rule over another.
Will people get around the rule by creating new property rights we
have not yet imagined? Will we make things worse for people by de-
priving them of the power to give up this right? Will we be depriving
people of the power to create a living space free of political
campaigning?
The democratic model of property does not confine us to a single
normative methodology or a single value. What is distinctive about
the democratic approach, however, is that it recognizes that choices
about property law are choices about social and political structure.17 0
We are obligated to recognize that the definition of property rights
does not merely involve promoting the autonomy of the owner; the
allocation and exercise of property rights imposes externalities on
others and on social life in general. Property owners have obligations
to use their rights in ways that are compatible with the basic norms of
our society, some of which are fundamental structural matters and
some of which are more specifically related to consumer protection
policies. In both cases, property law must comply with minimum stan-
dards for social relationships. In defining rights and obligations with
respect to property, we are obligated to consider the full range of
human values we care about rather than merely thinking quantita-
tively about how to maximize preferences.
My own view is that it is hard to see why the landlord's interests
would outweigh the tenant's interest in participating in the political
process in a manner that is customary in the United States, especially
when the landlord's prohibition is one that would be illegal if im-
posed by a municipal ordinance. Treating tenants as less than owners
by denying them the power to put up such signs (unless they can get
the landlord's consent) puts them in a position akin to peasants on
the lord's land, subject to his whim. Could the landlord condition the
lease on the tenant agreeing to give money to support the Republican
candidate for President? If not, why not? The answer has to do with
169 1 have described the variety of such normative methods in Singer, supra note 100.
170 See supra Part IV.A.3.
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the illegitimacy of mixing the lease of residential property with
choices about democratic elections. This is not a demand the land-
lord can legitimately make of the tenant. There are, of course,
counterarguments to these claims. The other tenants (and the neigh-
bors) may wish to live in a tranquil neighborhood that does not ex-
hibit contentious political views. But my point is that the democratic
model requires us to evaluate the legitimacy of claims on both sides by
reference to norms underlying the framework of a free and demo-
cratic society.
What does the democratic model of property contribute to our
thinking about the normative issues raised by the subprime mortgage
foreclosure mess? Both the libertarian and the efficiency approaches
would suggest getting rid of most regulations of property contracts,
including financing arrangements. This would suggest bringing back
strict foreclosure where any default, no matter how small, resulted in
loss of the entire property with no protection for built-in equity and
no need for notice and a hearing. It would suggest no usury laws of
any kind and no restrictions on the services home owners are allowed
to promise sellers and financers of land. But our society has firmly
rejected such a radical approach. Although we have a lot of land fi-
nancing arrangements that approximate this laissez-faire model, we
also have strict regulations of many kinds of mortgage arrangements
to prevent the worst abuses, and in most cases, we outlaw arrange-
ments akin to strict foreclosure, just as we now outlaw self-help evic-
tions of tenants where landlords put the tenant's belongings on the
street at the first sight of trouble. 171 As the recent housing legislation
shows, current norms support public policies designed to lead to the
rewriting of onerous mortgage agreements to replace them with af-
fordable terms so that families will not be unnecessarily evicted from
their homes.
What are the minimum standards for mortgage contracts in a
free and democratic society that treats each person with equal con-
cern and respect? Those minimum standards should prevent false,
fraudulent, and misleading sales tactics. They should discourage lend-
ing institutions from inducing people to buy homes they cannot af-
ford and are very likely to lose, while paying exorbitant rates they
could avoid if they leased instead of buying. The law should limit the
expected external social harms from displacement through foreclo-
sure-harms that are not only financial in nature. If we are interested
in promoting home ownership, we should do so in a way that seems
likely to achieve its purpose, rather than inducing people to buy
171 See Berg v. Wiley, 264 N.W.2d 145 (Minn. 1978) (holding that self-help eviction was
unlawful).
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homes on terms they cannot afford, resulting in displacement and loss
of family wealth.
All this suggests a need for regulations to prevent mortgage prov-
iders from selling what Elizabeth Warren calls "dangerous financial
products"1 72 and to protect homeowners who have the capacity to
comply with reasonable contract terms. Access to property is impor-
tant, but so is the stability of neighborhoods and families; that stability
is crucial to the social structure needed to provide tranquility and de-
velopment for individuals and their families. This does not mean that
we want government to manage everything; it does not mean that
there should never be any foreclosures. It does mean that we should
adopt appropriate regulations to protect families from getting into
contracts they would avoid if they had better information and which
will impose negative externalities on their neighbors that the neigh-
bors would avoid if they could. It means that mortgage financing ar-
rangements are not defensible if they do not treat borrowers with
dignity. Our response to the mortgage foreclosure crisis will not be
true to our values if we do not consider the legitimate contours of
market relationships in a free and democratic society that treats each
person with equal concern and respect. This approach may or may
not give a clear answer; it does, however, frame the issue appropriately
and it does ask the right questions.
V.
THINGS THAT WE WOULD LiKE To TAKE FOR GRANTED
Democracies care about each person, and they seek to treat every
person with humanity. "I am asking you to remind yourselves that in
this country, we rise or fall as one people," said Barack Obama. 173
"[A] country in which only a few prosper is antithetical to our ideals
and our democracy .... ,,174 This means that we must structure our
legal institutions so that each person can flourish, and that means that
we have obligations to others and not only rights for ourselves. "I am
asking you to join me in ushering in a new era of mutual responsibility
in America," Obama said.' 75 "[T]hose of us who have benefited
greatly from the blessings of this country have a solemn obligation to
open the doors of opportunity, not just for our children, but to all of
America's children." 176 The goal of such mutual responsibility is not
merely for property and wealth to be widely distributed but to ensure
172 See Warren, Making Credit Safer, supra note 30, at 35-36.
173 Our Common Stake, supra note 14.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.
DEMOCRATIC ESTATES 1061
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
that each of us can have the power to develop a full human life in
which we can flourish.
A democratic society requires thoughtful engagement with the
appropriate contours of social relationships among people who treat
each other as persons worthy of respect and dignity. People are enti-
tled to pursue happiness, satisfy their preferences, amass wealth, and
exercise their liberties, as long as they comply with reasonable regula-
tions designed to ensure the legitimate interests of others. Property
law defines the structure within which market and social relationships
go on. Rather than consisting of rules that limit freedom of contract,
property law sets the minimum standards for those market relation-
ships. Rather than an oppressive limitation on freedom, the estates
system, properly construed, protects us from illegitimate demands.
Because we live in a free and democratic society, we limit the terms on
which we can deal with each other; we do so to ensure that we treat
each other with common decency or equal concern and respect.
Rather than a crushing limitation on liberty imposed by a powerful
state, property law builds the floor on which we stand; it is the founda-
tion that lets us live our lives in conditions of human decency.
Hobbes and Locke argued that we institute government so that
we can attain security and prosperity.177 The rule of law gives us a
certain amount of peace of mind. We need not worry (or we can
worry less) about being assaulted on the street, about having strangers
intrude in our homes and take our things, about having to obey the
whim of an arbitrary lord. Property law defines things that we would
like to take for granted; it does so by setting the boundaries of just
social relationships. 178 Choosing those boundaries requires us to at-
tend to the full range of values that democracies represent. Those
choices cannot reasonably be made by reducing all interests to dollar
amounts and adding up costs and benefits; they cannot, in other
words, be reduced to a math problem. Because they involve funda-
mental values, they require human judgment about the contours of
social relationships in a free and democratic society that treats each
person with equal concern and respect.
177 See generally sources cited supra note 12.
178 See Singer, supra note 40, at 141 ("Our regulations... shape the house that we live
in, and the liberty that we value comes from having built that house and the environment
around it .... [T]he character of those background regulations matters enormously; they
determine the shape of our social world and the character of our economic
relationships.").
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